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Abstract 
The background for and the strategic context of this thesis is the threat posed by Russian 
submarines to Norway and NATO in the North Atlantic. In light of this, the study examines 
the significance of the P-8 and the trilateral partnership of Norway, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, by asking two research questions:  
 What is the operational significance of the P-8 and the trilateral partnership? 
 How does the P-8 and the trilateral partnership influence Norwegian security 
policy? 
It is an explorative and inductive study, which answers the research questions through a 
qualitative analysis. The thesis uses deterrence, crisis stability and maritime airpower theory, 
as well as Norwegian Security policy and defence concept, with emphasis on integration and 
reassurance to frame the discussion. 
The thesis concludes that the P-8 will provide Norwegian decision-makers with an agile 
platform with significantly improved capability for ASW and ISR. The trilateral partnership 
integrates the three partner nations and improves NATOs ASW capability when facing 
Russian submarines in the North Atlantic.  
The P-8 and the partnership influence deterrence positively by integrating Norway, NATO 
and the US, and provide tools for improving crisis stability. However, given the 
impermanency of American Poseidons, there is a need to establish a trilateral P-8 concept that 
merges training, exorcises and operations as a signal of presence and integration in the North 
Atlantic.  
The contribution of the P-8 in Norway’s policy of reassuring Russia is important as Norway 
increasingly develops a force structure with so-called offensive strategic capabilities. Of 
particular importance to reassurance is enhancements in intelligence contributions. Provided 
the strategic context, improved capabilities and the Norwegian force structure, the influence 
of the P-8 is decisive for the Norwegian security policy. 
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Sammendrag 
Bakgrunnen for denne oppgaven og den strategiske konteksten er trusselen Russiske ubåter 
utgjør for Norge og NATO i Nord-Atlanteren. I lys av dette undersøker oppgaven 
betydningen av P-8 og trilateralt samarbeidet mellom Norge, Storbritannia og USA, gjennom 
å stille to forskningsspørsmål: 
 Hva er den operative betydningen av P-8 og det trilaterale partnerskapet? 
 Hvordan påvirker P-8 og det trilaterale partnerskapet norsk 
sikkerhetspolitikk? 
Studien er eksplorativ og induktiv, og benytter kvalitativ metode for å besvare 
forskningsspørsmålene. Analysen nyttiggjør teorier for avskrekking, krisestabilitet og maritim 
luftmakt, i tillegg til norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med vekt på integrasjon og beroligelse, som 
rammeverk for diskusjonen. 
Oppgaven konkluderer med at P-8 vil tilføre norske beslutningstakere en fleksibel plattform 
som i betydelig grad bedrer evnen til anti-ubåt krigføring (ASW) og informasjonsinnhenting 
(ISR). Det trilaterale samarbeidet integrerer de tre partnernasjonene og bedrer NATOs evne til 
ASW i møte med russiske ubåter. 
P-8 og det trilaterale partnerskapet påvirker avskrekking positivt gjennom integrering av 
Norge, NATO og USA, og tilbyr muligheter for å bedre krisestabiliteten. På en annen side er 
det forventet at amerikansk tilstedeværelse med P-8 vil være av en mindre permanent 
karakter. Dette medfører et behov for et trilateralt P-8 konsept som sammenslår trening, 
øvelser og operasjoner i Nord-Atlanteren. 
P-8s bidrag innen beroligelse er av sentral karakter, ettersom Norge i økende grad satser på 
avskrekkende kapabiliteter i styrkestrukturen. Spesielt viktig er økt kapasitet innen 
etterretningsbidragene. Med utgangspunkt i den strategiske konteksten, forbedrede 
kapabiliteter og den norske styrkestrukturen, er innflytelsen til maritime patruljefly av 
avgjørende betydning for norsk sikkerhetspolitikk.  
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Part I –  Introduction 
Chapter 1. Background 
During the Cold War, NATO’s deterrence towards the Warsaw Pact relied on the ability to 
establish and maintain unfettered access to and through the North Atlantic. Rapid 
reinforcements to Norway and other allied partners from North America were essential to 
withstand Soviet invasion and occupation. As a response to NATO’s need for reinforcements 
and deployment across the North Atlantic, the Soviet maritime strategy gave priority to 
interdiction by extensive use of submarines. Consequently, NATO established and honed 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, developed technologies and established command 
& control structures to counter Soviet submarine threats. Through building proficiency in 
ASW at all levels, NATO was able to establish a credible deterrent in a contested battlespace 
as well as providing crucial protection of the ultimate deterrent – the nuclear ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN) (Hudson & Roberts, 2016, p. 77). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, naval war fighting capabilities in NATO suffered 
extensively from budget cuts, affecting in particular costly and complex ASW force 
structures. There existed no longer any obvious threats from Russian submarines, and the 
strategic environment called for a shift in strategy from deterrence and defence towards 
expeditionary warfare. Western naval forces consequently adapted to power projection 
towards land in environments largely uncontested by peer adversaries, rather than securing 
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) and establish sea control in contested ones (Efjestad, 
2016, p. 60; Hudson & Roberts, 2016, pp. 79-81; Tamnes, 2016, pp. 17-18). 
Recent year’s Russian military development and aggressive behaviour in international 
politics, accompanied by invasions in Georgia and Ukraine, caused NATO to revert to 
collective defence and deterrence measures aimed at preventing further Russian aggression 
(Friis, 2017, pp. 36, 41-42). As during the Cold War, protecting the transatlantic SLOC once 
again has become vital to NATO in order to re-establish a credible deterrent towards Russia. 
Despite the fall of the Iron Curtain, submarine platforms continued to evolve creating a 
technological offset currently in favour of the submarine (Efjestad, 2016, pp. 66-67; Hicks, 
Metrick, Samp, & Weinberger, 2016, p. V).  
With the atrophy of NATO ASW resources and increased activities and capabilities of 
Russian submarines, the North Atlantic is now considered “the weak link” in NATO, raising 
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doubts about NATO’s credibility in deterring Russia (P. Roberts, 2018). Possible transatlantic 
cable tampering by Russian special purpose submarines also raises concern in the west. 
Complex energy and transport infrastructures across the ocean floor – the foundation of 
western economy and welfare, stand out as vulnerable to Russian hybrid measures. Defending 
the SLOC is therefore more comprehensive than just protecting naval and commercial 
shipping from submarines (Hicks et al., 2016, pp. 4-12; Tamnes, 2016, pp. 21-22).  
A reinforced maritime posture for NATO, the reactivation of the US Navy 2nd Fleet and the 
establishment of an Atlantic Command for NATO is currently underway, as an initial effort to 
counter Russian efforts in the undersea domain and ensure the SLOC between Europe and 
North America (W. Morgan, 2018; NATO, 2018, p. 7). The broader solution also calls for 
advances in technology, tactics and not least capable platforms for ASW purposes. Magnus 
Nordenman, former director of the Scowcroft Center of Transatlantic Security Initiative, 
writes, “That a NATO maritime patrol aircraft consortium would be a cost-effective way for 
Alliance members to build a robust set of capabilities, at a time when NATO’s maritime 
flanks are increasingly turbulent, contested and competitive.” As Russian sub-surface 
challenges are among the most difficult challenges faced by the Alliance, it is a threat that 
deserves special attention. Airborne systems providing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) particularly provide a range of capabilities that stand out 
as urgent to re-establish within the Alliance (Nordenman, 2016, pp. 2, 9). 
 Topic and Research Questions 
The Royal Norwegian Air Force P-3 Orion MPA has been, and remains vital to Norwegian 
and allied policymakers for deterrence and crisis stability in the North Atlantic (Regjeringen, 
2016a, p. 65). Acknowledging the strategic challenges evolving in the North Atlantic as well 
as seeing the need for replacing the aging P-3 Orion and the DA-20 Falcon EW aircraft, the 
Norwegian Government ordered five P-8A Poseidon, due for service in 2022-2023. The 
Government describes the replacement as “a formidable platform for maritime surveillance”.  
The P-8 is a multi-mission maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, originally designed to 
replace the aging P-3C Orion for the US Navy, and has become the primary choice of MPA 
for other nations worldwide. The aircraft is fitted with the latest generation of sensors 
improving capabilities within the aircraft’s primary roles of ASW, ASuW (Anti-Surface 
Warfare) and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance). The all-weather capable P-8 
has a range of optical, electronic and acoustic sensors that are capable of both passive and active 
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detection, recognition, classification and identification of contacts at standoff distances (US Navy, 
2017). A range of weapons, including torpedoes for ASW and missiles for ASuW, can be loaded 
internally in the weapons bay or externally on wing-pylons. Increased reliability, flight 
characteristics and sensor capabilities are significant and evolutionary improvements 
compared to its P-3C Orion predecessor. The advances seen in sensor management, data 
fusion and connectivity are revolutionary developments (Rogoway, 2014a). The C4ISR 
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Surveillance & 
Reconnaissance) capabilities of the P-8A enable net-centric warfare in constellation with 
other air and seaborne surveillance and weapons platforms (GlobalSecurity, 2016).  
The Norwegian procurement comes following the United Kingdom government’s decision to 
take delivery of nine P-8A Poseidons in 2019-2021 (Regjeringen, 2017a; UK Ministry of 
Defense, 2016). With this procurement, government officials from Norway, the UK and the 
US have initiated a trilateral cooperation in maritime security founded on the P-8A Poseidon 
(Regjeringen, 2017c). On the 29th of June 2017, Pentagon stated that, “Today, Norway, the 
United Kingdom and the United States signed a statement of intent to lay out guiding 
principles for a trilateral partnership centred on the P-8A Poseidon aircraft to address the 
changing security environment in the North Atlantic” (US Department of Defense, 2017). 
How the aircraft is employed is likely a result of its capabilities and individual requirements 
of each of the countries, balanced with the needs of the NATO. 
The aim of this study is to research what significance the introduction of the P-8 and the 
trilateral partnership with the UK and the US has to Norway. The study analyses the 
operational impact of the aircraft by looking at ASW and ISR capabilities of the aircraft 
against the challenges posed by Russian submarines in the North Atlantic. The study 
furthermore looks at what implications the P-8 and the trilateral cooperation have on 
Norwegian security policy within the framework of deterrence, crisis stability and 
reassurance. The study consequently deals with two research questions: 
 What is the operational significance of the P-8 and the trilateral partnership? 
 How does the P-8 and the trilateral partnership influence Norwegian security 
policy? 
There exist little academic research on the subject of MPA operations. Maritime air power 
belongs conceptually and doctrinal to both airpower and seapower, and it seems that since it 
principally falls in-between the two service’s sphere of interest, it has been neglected  
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(Dyndal, 2015, p. 109). The P-8A Poseidon represents new capabilities and with the trilateral 
partnership, new possibilities arise for Norwegian policy-makers. It does however, invite to 
careful and sound judgements, as the employment of both the aircraft and the partnership has 
the potential of unintentional escalation or failed deterrence. The study consequently aims to 
contribute to policy-making and defence planning, by providing insight into how ASW and 
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) operations may affect strategic balance.  
 Disposition 
The study consist of three parts. Part I Introduction introduces the reader to the background, 
highlights its relevance and lays out two research questions, along with key terms and 
concepts important to the study. Part II Analytical Framework outlines the research approach 
and methodology, and presents theories on security policy and defence used in the research. 
Part III Analysis is the main body, consisting of chapter four to six. Chapter four initially 
discusses the strategic context, Russian military ambition and the threat Russian submarine 
capabilities constitutes in the North Atlantic and the High North, as well as the potential for 
conflict in the region. It finishes by examining the Norwegian security policy and defence 
concept in relation to Russia. Chapter five looks into the capabilities of the P-8 and the 
contributions of the transatlantic partnership, and discusses the operational significance it has 
for ASW and ISR operations. Chapter six examines how the P-8 and the trilateral partnership 
influence Norway’s security, specifically in deterrence, crisis stability and reassurance 
towards Russia. Part IV Conclusions highlights the findings in the analysis section and 
concludes on the research questions.  
 Key Terms and Concepts  
Security Policy is a central term in the thesis. The broad definition of security policy as 
defined by the Norwegian Government is to assure Norwegian sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political freedom of action, ensured by a comprehensive set of political 
instruments (Regjeringen, 2016b). For the purpose of this study, security is more narrowly 
defined and refers to state-to-state relations and the military as the main instrument of 
political power, rather than non-state actors requiring other measures of security. 
Armed conflict or war is a situation where the state’s existence, sovereignty, territorial and 
political freedom is threatened, and challenged through armed assault, military and political 
coercion by another state actor, which makes armed conflict and use of military resources for 
  
  
 
5 
 
defence legitimate in accordance United Nations Article 51 (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av 
Norge, 2015, pp. 7-8; United Nations, 1945).  
A Security Crisis is a situation that brings two or more states into conflict of interest, and 
there is perceived a risk of armed conflict or war (Skogan, 2009, pp. 28-29). A security crisis 
will unfold itself in the undefined areas between armed conflict or war, and peace. A security 
crisis falls outside the parameters of NATOs Article V, but may include other ways of allied 
aid (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015, pp. 7-9). 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is a general term commonly used for describing fixed wing 
aircraft fitted with sensors and weapons for maritime patrol missions and ASW. A range of 
other designations offer more precision towards specific characteristics and capabilities of 
maritime patrol aircraft. The P-3 Orion is for instance a Long-Range MPA (LRMPA), and the 
P-8A Poseidon is a Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), in essence an LRMPA with a 
broader range of missions (Håvold, 2015, pp. 15-18; US Navy, 2017). MPA is for this study 
used as a general term referring to the P-3 Orion and the P-8A Poseidon. 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) are efforts intended to prevent the enemy from exploiting 
their submarines in an effective manner. Anti-submarine Warfare includes all means that 
enable search, localization, classification, track, attack, avoidance, deterrence, neutralization 
or the destruction of opposing submarines (Forsvaret, 2015, p. 213; NATO, 2017a). High-end 
ASW refers to operations of particularly high intensity, for submarine surveillance or warfare 
purposes. 
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) are key maritime passageways facilitating large 
volumes of merchant shipping that carries trades of strategic value. SLOCs are of particular 
geostrategic importance. If blocked in time of crisis or war, it most likely strangle those 
depending on the SLOC. Geographically it refers to open stretches of waters, littorals, straits, 
choke points and harbours, and is in the study used in a broad sense (Khalid, 2012, pp. 1-2). 
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Part II – Analytical Framework 
Chapter 2. Methodology 
This chapter presents the research methodology and sources used in the study, discusses 
weaknesses and evaluates potential shortcomings in the validity and reliability of the research.  
Norway and the UK still have a way to go before reaching an operational capability with the 
P-8, however, the process of establishing a framework for support and concepts for operations 
is under way. The aircraft is currently in service with the US Navy, deployed into virtually 
any theatre the US has a maritime interest. The capabilities brought forward by the aircraft 
and its global presence have spawned numerous public articles, however, very few scientific 
studies appear. Consequently, the need for research in this field appears as relevant. 
The study is explorative as published research on the subject is scarce. It addresses specific 
and emerging technology, capabilities and concepts in a specific context, which makes it a 
case study. It aims at providing insight into the influence a trilateral P-8 partnership has on 
Norwegian defence and security. Moreover, by looking at MPA operations in relation to 
deterrence, crisis stability and reassurance, it contributes to a field of research where 
published work is rare, hence is it an inductive study. A qualitative design is consequently 
chosen for the study, aimed at establishing a nuanced analysis in depth of the research 
questions (Jacobsen, 2005, pp. 35-37, 62; Tjora, 2012, pp. 19, 22, 26). 
The study examines the research questions using primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources consist of public documents, speeches and interviews performed by the author. 
Secondary sources are reports, peer-review articles, books, press releases and theses as well as 
news sources. Interviews are central in the analysis, as little written material is publicly 
available on the subject. Informants were consequently selected among Norwegian experts 
with first-hand experience in security policy, intelligence, defence and maritime air 
operations. 
Arild Eikeland is the Arild Eikeland, Deputy Director General, Director for International 
Security Policy, Defence cooperation and operations in the Department of Security Policy and 
Operations, NOMOD. Eikeland coordinates the MOD’s cooperation regarding the P-8s with 
the US and the UK. His perspectives from the political level on security policy and the 
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trilateral partnership provided significant insight into the strategic significance of the P-8, as 
well as the current and future developments in the trilateral partnership.  
Lieutenant-General (R) Kjell Grandhagen, is the former Director of Norwegian Intelligence 
Service. Grandhagen worked with the intelligence services’ assessments and requirements for 
the P-8, during his period as director from 2010 to 2016. Grandhagen has an extensive career 
at the military strategic level, and his comprehension of Norway’s role in the High North, the 
relation between Norway and Russia, and Norway’s bilateral intelligence cooperation with the 
US, contributed to particular insight and nuance when analysing the P-8’s significance to 
Norway’s security policy. 
Brigadier-General Leif Sommerseth, Chief of Joint Operations at Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters at Reitan, is responsible for the conduct of Norwegian maritime patrol 
operations at the joint operational level. Sommerseth contributed to a comprehension of the 
significance of MPA operations in the High North from an operational level perspective. Of 
particular value to the analysis is his insights into the significance of Norway’s MPAs in the 
operational and strategic context.  
Brigadier-General Jan Ove Rygg, Commander Norwegian Air Operations Centre at Reitan, 
responsible for air operations at the tactical level, by tasking and execution of Norwegian 
national MPA operations. Rygg provided insightful perspectives on cooperation between new 
capabilities at the tactical level. Of particular significance to the analysis of network 
capabilities, is the possibilities inherent in cooperation between the P-8 and the F-35.  
Several books, reports, theses and articles have been central to the thesis. NATO and the 
North Atlantic – Revitalising Collective Defence, a Whitehall paper edited by Colonel John 
Andreas Olsen, which offers comprehension of NATOs challenges posed by the threat of 
Russian submarines in the North Atlantic (Olsen, 2017). The Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS) has published a range of comprehensive reports addressing the 
Russian submarine threat, and allied ASW capabilities for deterrence and defence in Europe. 
Two of these reports, Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe and Contested Seas contributed 
particularly to the choice of subject, and provided background and insight into Russian 
submarines and operations for the analysis (Hicks & Metrick, 2018; Hicks et al., 2016).  
Ole Marius Tørrisplass’ thesis on Deterrence and Crisis Stability – F-35 and Joint Strike 
Missile’s effect on Norwegian security policy towards Russia, provides a guideline for the 
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structure and design of the study (Tørrisplass, 2017a). Gjert Lage Dyndal’s article on A 
Theoretical Framework on Maritime Airpower offers insight into maritime airpower theory 
(Dyndal, 2015). Geoffrey Till’s Seapower provides theoretical perspectives on both seapower 
and deterrence (Till, 2013). 
The unclassified annual threat assessment from the Norwegian Intelligence Service, FOKUS 
2018, provides assessments on Russian interests, strategy capabilities (Etterretningstjenesten, 
2018). Russian submarine capabilities now include long-range precision guided weapons. 
Roger McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll’s Tools of Future Wars, and Ørjan Askvik’s thesis 
Utvikling av langtrekkende konvensjonelle presisjonsvåpen is thus of interest to the study, 
providing awareness of the strategic challenges posed by long-range precision strike 
capabilities (Askvik, 2015; McDermott & Bukkvoll, 2017). Unified Effort by the Expert 
Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, provides a first-hand knowledge on 
the Norwegian security policy, defence concept and the emerging security challenges for 
Norway (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015). 
The Joint Air Power Competence Center (JAPCC) report on Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare 
is a comprehensive study of technological, organisational and environmental challenges in 
ASW, as well as the state and future of NATOs ASW capabilities with emphasis on MPA’s. 
The study is used extensively in the analysis of the operational significance of the P-8 and the 
trilateral partnership (JAPCC, 2016). Harald Håvold’s NUPI report on Airborne Maritime 
Surveillance and ASW, sheds light on general and specific characteristics of maritime patrol 
aircraft and emerging developments for airborne ASW (Håvold, 2015). 
Håvard Klevberg’s  book Request Tango, covers a historic perspective on MPA operations 
and cooperation in the North Atlantic and the impact it had on Norwegian security policy 
during the Cold War. Klevberg’s comprehensive work contributed to my insight into the 
strategic significance of Norwegian MPA operations and of the influence of the P-8 on 
Norwegian security policy (Klevberg, 2012). 
A purposeful source selection of theory, written sources and interviews aims at establishing a 
solid empirical foundation, a nuanced analysis of the research questions, and enable 
triangulation of information to improve reliability and validity. The scarce amount of 
available research and the qualitative nature of the study led to the choice of in-depth 
interviews to improve reliability. Selection of informants from the political and all three 
military levels was done to improve nuance and capture difference in opinion as these could 
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be different or contradictory as a result of position in relation to the subject. However, the 
four informants were during interviews largely concurrent in their answers and views, thus 
strengthening confidence in reliability. 
Increasing the number of informants by selection of two informants from each level, could 
further improve reliability. However, given the time provided for the project the initial 
ambition was set at six informants. The selection of informants revealed that there existed few 
candidates with comprehensive insight into the subject that were willing to participate. The 
number of informants hence reduced to four. Interviews were conducted face to face in a 
semi-structured manner, using the interview guide as a reference, to ensure that relevant 
knowledge possessed by interviewees not covered in the interview guide was addressed 
(Jacobsen, 2005, pp. 142-145, 229-230; Tjora, 2012, pp. 104, 202-206). 
Theories of deterrence, crisis stability, airpower and seapower constitutes the theoretical 
framework for the analysis. Deterrence and defence theories are abundant in describing the 
strategic dynamics between bipolar superpowers during the Cold War. This goes for crisis 
stability theories as well since it ties closely to deterrence. However, conceived during a 
different time and strategic context, certain aspects of theories applicable to the Cold War and 
nuclear strategy does not fit the current reality nor the subject. Consequently, has the thesis 
aimed for theories that are suitable for the subject of this thesis, and establish a framework for 
the analysis rather than an item of discussion. 
This study treats air and seapower theories interdependently, as theories exclusive to maritime 
airpower are nearly non-existent. According to Dyndal should maritime airpower be 
understood as both airpower and seapower. Seapower provides the fundament for 
understanding maritime airpower’s purpose, i.e. what task and effect requirements that exist 
maritime domain. While airpower theory provides the characteristics,  possibilities and 
limitations embedded in airpower, height, speed, reach etc., governing factors for how air 
platforms accomplish tasks and achieve effects. Airpower theories are often criticised of being 
unscientific and overly optimistic, especially when considering the strategic effects of 
airpower. However, for this study the purpose of airpower theory is to provide insight into the 
physical characteristics of aircraft, rather than their doctrinal application (Dyndal, 2015, p. 
109; Naastad, 2006, pp. 406-408). 
Capabilities of the P-8 are provided by open sources due to the classified nature of ASW 
operations. Sources like Boing, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the United Kingdom 
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Ministry of Defence, the Royal Air Force, the US Department of Defence and the US Navy 
all provide open source data on the aircraft. As these institutions speak to a broader audience, 
there is a risk that openly available capabilities are over-appraised, thus introducing less 
confidence in However, background could improve validity and mitigate classification issues.  
My background as a Tactical Coordinator (TACCO) on the P-3 Orion and experience from 
Operational Test & Evaluation of the NH90 maritime helicopter implies that I have acquired 
first-hand knowledge of performance on systems comparable to the P-8. I am as such able to 
assess data available through open sources, thus improving validity and reliability. On the 
other hand, background may also be a source of bias. My service on MPAs could produce a 
biased analysis that favours a certain outcome for MPAs in the thesis. Informants also have a 
relation to the subject and may be predisposed by background as well. Consequently, I have 
strived to maintain an objective approach to the research and remain critical acting as an 
interviewer, as well as triangulate sources to increase reliability and validity (Jacobsen, 2005, 
pp. 19-20). 
The subject implies that classification could be a challenge in two ways. One is retrieving 
technical information for the analysis as ASW and MPA operations usually are classified. 
Two is the risk that the sum of all unclassified sources in the end requires a higher 
classification due to the combination of data and findings in the analysis. During interviews, 
the unclassified nature of the research was clearly stated, and readdressed at the end of the 
interview. In addition, open sources provided for capabilities. More importantly, the analysis 
circumnavigated precise capabilities and capacities, and was elevated to a general level using 
physics and theoretical examples to avoid classification issues. Finally, the interviewees 
examined the thesis prior to publication, with no objections to references or contents. 
Interviews used in research under governance of the Royal Norwegian Defence University 
College need to comply with some administrative requirements. Interviews are subject to 
public privacy policies, requiring approval from both Personvernombudet for Forskning 
(Appendix A), and The Royal Norwegian Defence University College (Appendix B). The 
interview guide was available to informants a few days in advance of the interview for 
preparation (Appendix C), and the interview and information consent form (Appendix D) 
forwarded for interviewee signature. Prior to publication of the thesis, each informant had the 
opportunity to approve references used in the study.  
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Chapter 3. Theory 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the analysis section. Deterrence and crisis 
stability provide perspectives on security policy at the strategic level, whereas maritime 
airpower theory is the conceptual application of airpower in order to achieve maritime 
objectives. Firstly comes the definition and background, distinctions and principal 
mechanisms of deterrence. Secondly, definitions, concept and mechanisms of crisis stability. 
Finally, a definition and description of maritime airpower with emphasis on the roles of 
maritime patrol aircraft in ASW and ISR in contributions to sea control and sea denial. 
 Deterrence 
Deterrence can be described the manipulation of other individuals’ behaviour through threats. 
The type of threats vary but often include the use of physical force, confusion or bluffing 
opponents by conveying a perception that their attempts will be unsuccessful or even costly to 
achieve (Freedman, 2004, p. 6). A more contemporary definition suited for security and 
defence comes from maritime strategist Geoffrey Till, “Acts of deterrence are aimed at 
preventing someone from doing something by creating an expectation that the likely cost of 
the act would exceed the likely benefits”. Deterrence tends to be passive rather than active, a 
matter of intentions and perceptions, and general as opposed to specific (Till, 2013, p. 233).  
Contemporary use of deterrence in military strategy comes according to Freedman, from early 
airpower theorists of the 1920s and 1930s, pondering whether retaliatory bombing of civilian 
infrastructure and public will, could act as a means of preventing enemy air raids. As nuclear 
weapons entered the scene and the Cold War unfolded, it became apparent that there was no 
way of fighting a war without the complete annihilation of society, making it a compelling 
case to avoid war. The assured destruction posed by nuclear war presented such a credible 
threat that nuclear deterrence became the primary among strategies up until the fall of the Iron 
Curtain (Freedman, 2004, pp. 9-10; Naastad, 2006, pp. 399-402).  
Patrick M. Morgan (2012) argues that nuclear deterrence lost its significance because of the 
exit of peer-competitors for USA after the Cold War. With the re-emergence of Russia on the 
international stage viewing the West as an opposing power, great power politics re-emerged, 
and so did deterrence (Friis, 2017, p. 1). Despite resemblance to the Cold War, the 
contemporary strategic context offers some added complexity to traditional deterrence. 
Russian doctrine for use of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) to escalate-deescalate a 
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conventional conflict, nuclear proliferation, hybrid warfare and allied Ballistic Missile 
Defence (BMD) all offers their own set of challenges regarding the applicability of traditional 
deterrence. (Facon, 2017, p. 14; P. M. Morgan, 2012, pp. 91-92; Zysk, 2017b). 
Deterrence by conventional means applied to the maritime environment – naval deterrence in 
the conventional sense, appears of particular interest to Norway and speaks specifically to this 
study. Geoffrey Till (2013) refers to general and immediate deterrence as distinguishable 
forms in a broad description of naval deterrence. First, general deterrence is a passive and 
implicit form of deterrence characterized by stability. This is the case when opponents 
maintain armed forces and regulate their relationship without actively seeking to mount an 
attack on each other (P. M. Morgan, 2003, p. 9). The continuous presence of naval or other 
forces capable of armed intervention in a region are illustrative of general deterrence (p. 238).   
Second, immediate deterrence is a specific, active and explicit form characterized by urgency. 
In this case, there exist an identifiable adversary and a foreseeable action that requires 
deterrence in time of crisis or emergency (Freedman, 2004, pp. 40-41; Till, 2013, p. 238). 
Immediate deterrence, “concerns the relationship between opposing states where at least one 
side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in 
order to prevent it” (P. M. Morgan, 1983, p. 30). Speed and strategic mobility are 
advantageous characteristics of naval power when establishing immediate deterrence towards 
specific threats. The acuteness of immediate deterrence implies that general deterrence is frail 
or has failed (Till, 2013, p. 238).  
There are two ways states influence the cost-benefit calculus, denial and punishment. 
Punishment is coercive and threatens to impose cost by overwhelming retaliation against an 
attacking adversary. It aims at providing powerful incentives for an opponent to choose a 
particular path. Denial on the other hand, is essentially about controlling and denying an 
opponent strategic options or benefits. This can be obstructing military or political ends. 
Denial offers a more reliable strategy because it offers control by denying the enemy the 
benefit of choice. It may however come at a greater enforcement cost than punishment, which 
is the reason NATO chose nuclear punishment over conventional denial for deterrence during 
the Cold War (Freedman, 2004, pp. 36-40). 
Deterrence hinges upon capable and credible threats. A capable threat is a threat convincing 
the opponent that he will be better off if the threat does not become action. In other words the 
capabilities to support the threat. A state facing a capable threat therefore prefers the status quo 
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to conflict. A credible threat has to be believable, by displaying the will to enforce a threat. 
States that prefer fight to surrender possess credibility in their threat, and those who back down 
do not. It is essentially about exhibiting implementation-force and commitment to threats, and 
having the adversary buying it. As the defender aims at being credible, it is really the perception 
of the target that determines credibility. Perception is as such a matter of successfully getting 
intentions across, which highlights the importance communications and posture has to 
credibility (P. M. Morgan, 2003, pp. 15-16; Quackenbush, 2010, p. 64).  
Credibility has historically been one of two central concerns in deterrence practice and theory. 
In addition to getting the right message across, bluffing regarding military capabilities became 
a way of falsely enhancing deterrence. Both the Soviet Union and USA went this way during 
the Cold War. As surveillance capabilities became better, it became increasingly difficult to 
bluff, closing the gap between actual capabilities and perception. The other central concern to 
deterrence theory and practice is crisis stability (P. M. Morgan, 2003, pp. 15-17). 
 Crisis Stability 
Crisis stability can according to Forrest E. Morgen be described as, “the degree to which 
mutual deterrence between adversaries can hold in confrontation”. Crisis stability does not 
imply that crises are infrequent or impossible, but when a crisis occur the mechanisms of the 
system does not deepen the crisis. Rather it prevents escalation to extreme levels of violence, 
and offers a safe return to status quo (Langlois, 1991, p. 801; Miles, 2016, p. 425; F. E. 
Morgan, 2013, p. xiii).  
To achieve stability, deterrence needs to be mutual. Mutual deterrence exist, not due to 
military balance between two sides, but because of stability in the relationship (Schelling, 
1980, p. 232). Stability in general terms relates to how a system responds when challenged, it 
generally exist in one of two conditions, stable or unstable condition (Jervis, 1993, p. 250). 
Crisis instability emerge as soon one of the parties starts considering attack as a viable option 
(F. E. Morgan, 2013, p. 17). 
Stability is subject to offense-defence balance and their influence on the security dilemma. 
When the offensive has the advantage, offensive actions towards the enemy is more likely to 
win you the war than defensive actions. Contrary, when defence has the advantage, then 
defensive actions prevail over offensive (Jervis, 1978, p. 187). Offensive actions require 
offensive capabilities and vice versa. Thus is it the force structure, i.e. weapons capabilities 
and policies that label forces as offensive or defensive. Increase in offensive and defensive 
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force capabilities can both cause instability. Even if intended at maintaining status quo, added 
capabilities can inadvertently decrease security of others, causing a security dilemma to arise 
(Jervis, 1993, p. 243). Offensive capabilities are however more likely to propel instability and 
cause a security dilemma than defensive ones. (Jervis, 1978, p. 188).  
The security dilemma drives states into a spiralling contest attempting to increase their own 
and decrease other’s security (Jervis, 1978, p. 169). The spiral model of conflict has a 
dynamic action-reaction relationship where the inability to interpret each other’s behaviour 
magnify and accelerate conflict (Jervis, 1993, pp. 243-244). Even though there is no intent of 
attack, efforts to maintain status quo are mistaken for expansion, thus heightening tensions in 
fear of aggression (Jervis, 1978, p. 181). Of particular interest in this dynamic is the 
prisoner’s dilemma, a game theory explaining how defection becomes the rational choice 
over cooperation. The configuration of payoffs provides strong incentives to choose strategies 
that yield less desirable outcome for both participants, than choosing a cooperative strategy. 
The least preferable outcome is the one where the opponent defects first (Schelling, 1980, p. 
214).  
The dynamics of prisoner’s dilemma becomes apparent if one of the participants possess the 
capability to conduct a surprise attack, and by doing so seemingly provide for advantages on 
the battlefield. If both adversaries have first-strike capabilities, then a pre-emptive strategy to 
avoid being attacked may appear advantageous (Jervis, 1993, p. 242; Miles, 2016, p. 426). 
The dynamics is explained by Thomas Schelling, “He was about to kill me in self-defence, so 
I had to kill him in self-defense” Or, “He thinking I was about to kill him in self-defense, was 
about to kill me in self-defense, so I had to kill him in self-defense” (Schelling, 1980, p. 232).  
Reassurance provides on the other hand measures to improve Crisis stability. By arms control, 
and showing the adversary that the state will refrain from attack, despite having credible and 
capable deterrent measures the stability can improve (Jervis, 1993, p. 244). Likewise, 
conditions that deter attack or convince decision makers that successful attack is more 
difficult than successful defence, contribute to stability. While conditions inviting to attack 
with a greater belief that attack is easier than defence, erodes stability (F. E. Morgan, 2013, 
pp. 24-25). Crisis stability is present as long as neither side's weapons present vulnerabilities 
that could attract a pre-emptive strike, and that initiating conflict by surprise attack does not 
justify the cost-risk calculus. Limiting each side’s vulnerabilities to surprise attack, and 
possessing survivable second strike capabilities assuring retaliatory response, and balancing 
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threats with restrain are as such stabilizing factors removing the incentives for a first strike 
(Miles, 2016, p. 426; F. E. Morgan, 2013, p. xiii). Crisis stability is consequently a result of 
how states posture and structure military forces, without provoking war (F. E. Morgan, 2013). 
 Maritime Airpower 
Understanding the link between aircraft characteristics explained in airpower theory and the 
rationale for maritime application is fundamental for understanding maritime airpower. First, 
a look at the general characteristics of aircraft and the advantages and limitations of airpower. 
Second, a definition of maritime airpower appropriate for this study. Third, the aspects of 
seapower that are relevant for this study. Fourth and last, an examination of core capabilities 
and the specialized roles for maritime airpower. 
The core attributes of airpower are speed, reach and height. Airpower sets itself apart from 
land- and seapower by being unimpeded by terrain. Air covers the entire earth’s surface, 
oceans cover just two thirds and landmass the remaining third, airpower consequently possess 
the ability to project power globally. Speed enables the exploitation of time, providing control 
of tempo. By enjoying unparalleled reach, airpower covers large distances, including 
operations deep into the territory of enemies. The advantage of height provides a vantage 
point only surpassed by space based platforms. The inherent qualities of speed, reach and 
height offers ubiquity, agility and concentration of force, a combination that provides a high 
degree of flexibility, responsiveness and scalability (NATO, 2016a).  
The most significant limitations to airpower are impermanency, payload limitations and 
relative vulnerability. First, payload limits the fuel, and limited fuel means impermanency. 
Air operations deal with impermanency by sequencing operations in time and space, which 
affects force concentration and sustainment of air operations over time since air resources are 
in high demand. Second, payload limitations moreover has consequences for weapons, 
sensors and crew carried. Weight restrictions to stores and sensors consequently limit the 
flexibility to change roles during a mission. Hence will low payload aircraft largely depend on 
ground stops for reconfiguration. Third, air assets are relatively vulnerable as they come 
lightly armoured and depend on sophisticated technology that require comprehensive 
infrastructure and logistics support to sustain operations. Circumnavigating vulnerability often 
comes with limitations on tactics and operational concepts, restricting options available for 
decision makers (NATO, 2016a). 
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NATO doctrine highlights Counter-air, Attack, Air mobility, JISR (Joint Intelligence 
Reconnaissance & Surveillance) and personnel recovery as core capabilities and concepts 
specific to airpower (NATO, 2016a). Although airpower concepts to a certain degree has 
applicability in maritime operations, airpower theory is inadequate for discussing maritime 
airpower, and consequently a definition of maritime airpower theory is required. 
Dyndal (2015) discusses in his article A theoretical framework of Maritime Air Power that the 
understanding of maritime airpower among scholars and military, span over a range different 
definitions. Maritime airpower should include ‘naval airpower’ also known’ as ‘organic 
aircraft’ a commonly used term for sea-based aviation, be it carrier based combat aircraft, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or helicopters operating from surface combatant ships. It 
should also include land-based airpower operating in the maritime domain. Maritime airpower 
theory should be founded on the application of airpower for achieving maritime objectives. 
Not whether air assets are organic or land-based, commanded or administered by naval or air 
forces (p. 111). 
A cross-service definition for maritime airpower used in this study is, “Maritime air power 
constitutes the parts of air power, which are being applied in the maritime theatre to fulfil 
maritime objectives, as well as achieving the necessary degree of air control for maritime 
operations within the area of interest” (Dyndal, 2015, p. 112). 
There are several maritime objectives in seapower theory, for this study there are two in 
particular that requires examination, sea control and sea denial. 
Sea Control is an absolute term and a clearly definable and achievable objective for military 
commanders. Allied Joint Publication 3.3.3 Air Maritime Coordination states that, “Sea 
control allows the use of the sea in specified areas and for specified periods of time” (NATO, 
2014). Achieving sea control requires the demonstration or credible threat of force, and relies on 
naval forces maintaining capabilities and exorcising control in three dimensions: above, at and 
under the surface of the sea. Sea control secures own use of the sea and littoral areas, at the same 
time preventing enemy the effective use. Protection of SLOC by convoying and escort provides 
an example of local sea control. Sea control consists of two fundamental dimensions, denying the 
opponent from effectively using the sea for his purpose, while safeguarding own military as well 
as commercial operations (Dyndal, 2015, pp. 114-115; NATO, 2014; Till, 2013, pp. 150-151). 
Sea Denial is to prevent the enemy from using a defined area where one is unable to secure 
sea control for own use, by choice or lack of capability. It is both an alternative and a 
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complement to sea control. The Russian Bastion Defence is an illustrating example of a 
complimentary strategy, with the ambition of sea control in the Barents Sea, and extending 
sea denial into the Norwegian Sea and Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap as a 
perimeter defence (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015, p. 20; NATO, 2014).  
China employs a similar concept based on Gorshkov’s concentric layered defence that the 
Americans call Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). Weapons and technology developments 
for the past decades, especially submarines with long-range precision guided weapons and 
long-range air defence systems have made denial strategies increasingly influential and 
challenging to face in contemporary warfare. The implications are that smaller maritime states 
is gaining strategic impact by denial strategies, enabling the ability to obstruct allied maritime 
operations by placing unacceptable risk to surface units. For Norway the significance is that 
as technology favours the offensive and as weapons ranges increase, time and space is 
compressed, making the strategic depth to the defence of Norway increasingly challenging 
(Dyndal, 2015, pp. 115, 122; Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015, pp. 29, 34; Till, 
2013, pp. 152-153). 
Considering all three dimensions air, surface and subsurface warfare in relation to the 
maritime commander’s sea control or sea denial objectives, a wide range of core capabilities 
and specialized roles for maritime airpower exist. As the aim of this study is to research P-8 
and the transatlantic partnership and deal with the threat posed by Russian submarines, only 
some of the specialized roles apply. Subsequently ‘Information Exploitation’, and ‘Subsurface 
Warfare’ are the relevant core capabilities of maritime airpower Dyndal (Dyndal, 2015, pp. 
120-126). Derived from the two core capabilities is ISR and ASW as the specialized roles for 
MPA. ISR is in the context of this study, linked to ASW in broad surveillance, like 
surveillance of piers, submarine specific Command & Control infrastructures etc., hence an 
integrated part of theatre wide ASW efforts. 
ASW are operations with the objective of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. 
It includes search, localization, classification, track, attack, avoidance, deterrence, 
neutralization or the destruction of opposing submarines (Forsvaret, 2015, p. 213; NATO, 
2017a). ASW operations are preferably conducted in a coordinated effort between land- and 
sea-based aircraft, surface ships and friendly submarines. There are two overall strategies 
available to conduct ASW, these are defensive and offensive ASW operations (Dyndal, 2015, 
p. 122; NATO, 2014). 
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Defensive ASW are operations against an enemy submarine that has tactical freedom of 
operation in an area. Typically in relation to convoying or escort operations, denying the 
enemy offensive operations against own forces. Speed and endurance makes MPA primary 
assets for countering and prosecuting a submarine enjoying freedom of operation. Defensive 
ASW is as such reactive operations, requiring joint coordinated efforts between aircraft, 
surface ships and attack submarines. The ASW capable aircraft contribution to this triad of 
platforms enable the commander to protect the force by ‘defence in depth’. It is however 
platform intensive, complex and requires close coordination among participants in three 
dimensions (Dyndal, 2015, p. 122; NATO, 2014). 
Offensive ASW are operations that proactively aim at denying the submarine freedom of 
action. Typical courses of actions are blocking off choke points, fencing a submarine from 
reaching the open ocean or attacking it prior to reaching waters that allow submerged 
operations. The primary objective of offensive ASW is to neutralize or control the submarine 
before it becomes a threat. The premise for offensive ASW is the ability to find and track 
enemy submarines at will, knowing their location at all times and consequently achieving sea 
control, thus termed ‘hold at risk’. A conduct of ASW, that has been peripheral to maritime 
strategy and concepts of warfare, and existed merely as a part of intelligence driven and 
secretive tracking of Russian SSBNs during the Cold War. Hold at risk, similar to defensive 
ASW, relied on coordinated operations between platforms, in this case MPA’s, intelligence 
ships, hunter submarines and passive arrays of underwater hydrophone listening posts – 
Sound-Underwater Surveillance (SOSUS) (Dyndal, 2015, p. 122; NATO, 2014). 
Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance provides decision makers with actionable 
information. ISR is an integrated intelligence and military set of capabilities that ensures the 
collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination of information directly supporting 
operations through planning and execution. By establishing understanding of potential crisis 
points, ISR supports the strategic level by enhancing situational awareness and thus the 
quality of decisions both at the military and political level. At the operational and tactical 
level, ISR allows the observation of an adversary’s posture and actions, creating an 
understanding of his strengths, vulnerabilities and dependencies (NATO, 2016a).  
Intelligence is in this broad context described as the product derived from collecting and 
processing information on the environment, capabilities and intentions of others. For this 
particular study the collection disciplines of ACINT (Acoustic Intelligence), SIGINT (Signals 
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Intelligence) and IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) are the most important to know, providing 
technical, quantitative assessments and detailed knowledge on adversary force posture 
capabilities, vulnerabilities, doctrine and intentions (NATO, 2016a). 
Surveillance is systematic observation, not towards a specific target, but generally in areas of 
interest over prolonged periods. The objective of surveillance efforts is to establish an 
awareness of what can be construed as ‘the normal’ situation, and by detecting changes in 
threat due to activities or initiatives provide ‘indications and warnings’ (NATO, 2016a). 
Reconnaissance are focused efforts to obtain information on specific activities, resources or 
capabilities of an adversary, or the environmental characteristics in an area of interest. It is 
generally time constrained and time critical, as reconnaissance provides other tasked assets 
with mission critical information (NATO, 2016). 
This chapter offers a theoretical framework for the analysis section. Deterrence and crisis 
stability on one hand provide definitions and mechanisms influential to maritime strategy and 
security policy. Airpower characteristics, seapower objectives and consequently the roles of 
maritime airpower provides a fundament for discussing operational significance of the P-8 
and the transatlantic partnership.
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Part III – Analysis 
Chapter 4. Russia in the High North and Norwegian Security Policy 
Chapter four discusses Russian strategic ambitions, the importance of the North Atlantic, their 
submarine force and capabilities. It further looks at Norwegian security policy and 
implications of allied partnership, as well as the most relevant aspects of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces Long Term Plan (LTP). It starts by discussing Russian strategy and maritime 
ambitions in the North Atlantic. The comprehension of strategy and ambitions provides a 
fundamental understanding of the potential for conflict in this region. Then, I examine the 
significance of Russian submarine capabilities, as well as the Bastion Defence Concept in the 
event of a conflict. At the end, I look at Norwegian security policy, with emphasis on 
deterrence and reassurance towards Russia within the NATO alliance. 
 Russia 
Russia is currently a resurgent state with considerable great power ambitions that expresses 
strong anti-western views. As Russia seeks to assert its role and influence on the international 
arena it exercises instruments of political and military power to obstruct Western security and 
economy cooperation with prior Soviet satellite states. Although the development of Russian 
military capabilities is largely predictable, they possess the ability to threaten Norway and 
allied security. When considering Russia’s grand strategy, aggressive behaviour and 
expressed hostility towards the West, there is no reason being overly optimistic about 
Kremlins intent. Moreover, as the West worries about Russian intentions and increasingly 
destabilizing capabilities, the Russian authorities consider the strengthening of NATO 
military capabilities close to Russian spheres of interest its primary threat. Resulting in a 
deepening mistrust between the two (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015, pp. 16-
17; Payne & Foster, 2017, pp. 3-5). 
Although the strategic situation may resemble that of the Cold War, strategic stability has 
suffered erosion, and the risk of uncontrollable escalation is consequently increased. This 
relates to two significant changes in Russian grand strategy and military doctrine after the 
Cold War. 
First, since crisis and conflict are logical consequences of Putin’s expansionist grand strategy, 
the current situation lacks the stabilizing rules of conduct that was present during the Cold 
war (Hamre & Conley, 2016, p. 44; Payne & Foster, 2017, p. 14). Norwegian Intelligence 
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Service contributes to this view, by saying that the Russian threat perception involves viewing 
‘conflict’ as something constantly going on between irreconcilable systems of governance. 
Seeing how Russia is applying non-military or hybrid means in conjunction with traditional 
military force, the distinction between civilian and military, as well as peace and conflict 
blurs. The sum of changes in Russian doctrine points to a ‘new normal’ in the strategic 
situation (Grandhagen, 2015, p. 45). 
Second, Moscow intends to enforce its expansionist moves with threat of nuclear first-use. 
Russia’s current inferiority to the US in conventional military force gave birth to the doctrine 
of ‘escalate to de-escalate’. A strategy designed to stop the enemy from expanding a 
conventional conflict, imposition cost by using non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). As 
Russia has a broad range of dual-capability delivery missile systems, i.e. the capability to 
deliver both nuclear and conventional payloads, the distinction between conventional and 
nuclear attack becomes difficult to identify in the early stages of an attack. Thus risking 
unwarranted escalation and a regional crisis developing into a strategic conflict (Payne & 
Foster, 2017, pp. 3-4; Zysk, 2017a, p. 323). 
Moreover, recent Russian doctrine increasingly emphasises conventional precision-guided 
weapons, reflecting that most military threats facing Moscow are non-nuclear. Still, the 
Russian doctrine has not abandoned NSNW, and the weapons inventory remains in 
substantial numbers counting 760 warheads in the navy alone (Kristensen & Norris, 2017, p. 
123; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 174). Payne & Foster conclude that NSNW plays a 
major role in the coercion of NATO, giving Russia freedom to pursue its expansionist goals. 
The lack of stabilizing rules and risk of unwarranted escalation thus increases the risk of 
strategic conflict (Payne & Foster, 2017, p. 56). 
 Russia in the High North and the Potential for Conflict  
The High North is on the one hand of major economic interest to Russia. On the other, there is 
the military strategic significance the region has to Russia’s great power ambitions. 
Consequently is it within these perspectives the potential for conflict is most likely to occur.  
One, the economic potential represented by this region, although much of it cannot be realised 
yet, is strongly influential on Russian thinking and planning (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 
175; Tamnes, 2016, p. 21). The Russian government aims at developing the Arctic as its 
primary foundation for natural resources within 2020, which is key for sustaining the great 
power ambition (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015, p. 19; Sergunin & Konyshev, 
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2018, pp. 41-42). The considerable modernization and restructuring of Russian military 
forces, with expanded military presence in the Arctic archipelagos of Franz Josef Land, 
reopened military bases and new infrastructures along with the creation of Arctic brigades and 
command structures, could consequently be explained by economic developments in the 
Arctic (Etterretningstjenesten, 2018, p. 21; Hamre & Conley, 2016, pp. 46-47). 
Although concerns over a regional conflict between Russia and Norway related to petroleum 
resources have been voiced, it does not seems likely to be a cause for less stabile region. 
Russia’s dependency on Western funds, technology and expertise for exploitation, combined 
with common interests in Search and Rescue (SAR), environmental protection and fishery 
resource management creates a strong foundation for cooperation with Norway. 
Institutionalized soft power cooperation further strengthens stability between the two. Both 
Norway and Russia has agreed to solve any contradictory claims through the principals of 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and United Nations 
Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret 
av Norge, 2015, pp. 19, 21; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2018, p. 54).  
Another issue highlighted as a potential challenge to regional or bilateral stability between 
Russia and Norway is Svalbard. The Svalbard treaty of 1920 provided Norway sovereignty 
over the Spitsbergen archipelago that since 1925 has been a part of the Norwegian kingdom. 
Several signatory states dispute jurisdiction and enforcement of Norway’s sovereign rights 
related to fishery around Svalbard. Russia has since 2004 been sending the Northern Fleet on 
regular patrols to the area, as an objection to the Norwegian stance (Sergunin & Konyshev, 
2017, pp. 178-179). Although a potential source of regional instability, it is more likely that 
Svalbard becomes an arena of conflict of military strategic character rather than the origin. 
Should a crisis spiral out of control and a conflict become a reality, a Russian foothold on the 
archipelago to establish control and deny NATO military use of the geography could be 
anticipated (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015, pp. 21-22).  
Two, the High North is of particular military strategic significance to Russia. Russian 
strategic outlook determines USA as Russia’s peer adversary and maintains that American 
and allied activity in the North is an attempt at western expansion, destabilising regional and 
strategic stability (Etterretningstjenesten, 2018, p. 21; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 174). 
The containment strategy of the Cold War is consequently back in the Russian doctrine, and 
at the core lies strategic deterrence. Hence are Russia’s strategic submarines and the 
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protection of these Moscow’s highest priority and the primary rationale for the geostrategic 
relevance of the High North (Etterretningstjenesten, 2018, p. 21). The strategic submarines as 
one of the three legs in Russia’s nuclear triad, has primacy in Russia’s defence strategy, not 
only as a key element of Russian security, it also holds a symbolic value as a guarantor of 
Russian great power status (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2018, p. 144). 
The Russian strategic deterrent has two major threat directions to consider for its defence in 
the High North. Coming from the north is the threat of strategic missiles and strategic flights 
from North America across the North Pole towards Russia. The other from the west, through 
the North Atlantic, GIUK gap and the Norwegian Sea, constitutes the maritime threat from 
USA and NATO. The Norwegian assessment of 2015 determines that the potential for a 
military conflict between Russia and the Alliance in this region is likely due to spillover 
effects from escalations of armed conflict in other regions, and not caused by instability in the 
High North. The assessment from 2015 consequently viewed the High North and Arctic as 
relatively stable (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015). 
The regional stability has however trended negatively since 2015, as Russia has conducted a 
series of mock attacks against Norwegian military facilities and repeatedly jammed GPS 
signals in Norway’s northernmost county Finnmark (Nilsen, 2018). As the West is picking up 
the pace with Russia in maritime deterrence, a call for a forward and competitive strategy for 
NATO and the US could emerge as an offensive posture on the Northern flank, similar to that 
of the ‘Forward Maritime Strategy of the 1980’s’. A strategy that transitioned western ASW 
strategy from defensive containment to an offensive hold at risk strategy, for chasing down 
and offer pre-emptive strike opportunity on Soviet strategic submarines. Major concerns was 
voiced however, as an aggressive forward presence in the Bastion could threaten the Soviet 
Union into a security dilemma. In which a pre-emptive strike remained a viable option for 
Russian self-defence, and consequently erode crisis stability (Fanjoy, 1990, pp. 5-10; Tamnes, 
2018, pp. 16-21; Wills, 2018). 
Former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov the inventor of 
modern Soviet Naval doctrine, argued that the combination of mobility, concealment, global 
reach and high striking power made the submarine a strategic resource for armed forces and 
maritime power. For military-economic reasons the submarine was the most effective way the 
Soviet Union could gain parity with the substantially larger surface fleet of the West after 
World War II. According to Gorshkov, all the main factors characterizing the power of a navy 
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is inherently present in nuclear submarines, a view that remains central in Russian maritime 
strategy today (Gorshkov, 1979, p. 192).  
Although not in any terms near Cold war levels in quantity, the Northern Fleet is growing in 
capability. As Russia’s largest and most powerful naval force, it is currently in a state of 
transition going from quantity to quality. As Russia modernizes its navy and now operates in 
a tempo not seen since the Cold War, submarines remain the capital ships of the Russian 
Navy and enjoys the highest priority in developing technology and capability (Office of Naval 
Intelligence, 2015, pp. 15-17; Olsen, 2017, p. 5).  
The Northern Fleet currently houses a range of submarines and underwater capabilities 
categorized in three forces, Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs), Multi-purpose Submarines 
(SSN/SSGN/SSK) and Special Mission Submarines (SSAN). 
First, the backbone of the Russian strategic deterrent and the core of the Northern Fleet are 
the SSBNs (Hicks et al., 2016, p. 9; Tamnes, 2016, pp. 23-24). Two classes of submarines 
constitute the Russian sea based deterrent, namely the legacy Delta IV class and the new 
fourth generation Borei class, or Dolgorukiy in NATO language. The Delta IV SSBNs will 
constitute the mainstay of the strategic submarines until mid-2020s carrying the SS-N-23 
Sineva SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile). Upgrades to these missiles warheads 
will keep six Delta IV submarine in service until 2030 (Kristensen & Norris, 2017, p. 120; 
Payne & Foster, 2017, p. 52; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 181). 
The Borei came into service in 2013 with three hulls currently operational, one in the 
Northern Fleet and two in the Pacific. A subsequent and improved design will be the next 
step, with a planned delivery of in total eleven Borei II/Borei A in addition to the initial three, 
bringing the total up to fourteen. Each of the initial Borei designs are capable of carrying 16 
SS-N-32 Bulava SLBMs with a range of 8.500 km, whereas the improved Borei II increases 
the number of Bulava’s to 20. Plans to develop a Borei III design has however been scrapped 
due to unsatisfactory economic feasibility, according to Alexey Rakhmanov, the head of 
Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation (Gady, 2018). In addition to the Bulava, the Borey 
also carries a variety of torpedoes and cruise missiles for multipurpose missions (Office of 
Naval Intelligence, 2015, pp. 17-18; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 181). The Borey is 
assessed to be slightly quieter than the Akula-class SSN and comparable to the American 
Ohio-class in terms of mission capabilities, thus a very capable weapons system (Hicks et al., 
2016, p. 14). 
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Second, the Northern Fleet claimed in 2016 to have 23 multi-purpose and attack-submarines 
in active service, and about half of those operational at any given time. Legacy submarines 
from the Cold War include the Kilo class SSK (Conventional Submarine) and four classes of 
SSNs (Nuclear powered attack submarine) and SSGNs (Nuclear powered guided missile 
submarine).  
On the one hand, there is the legacy Akula, Sierra, Victor and Oscar submarines, although 
conceived during the Cold War they still boast considerable capabilities and comes armed 
with conventional and nuclear torpedoes and missiles. Providing for Russian sea denial and 
sea control operations in the North Atlantic in defence of the SSBNs, and denial operations to 
obstruct NATO freedom of movement across the Atlantic. On the other hand, there is the 
Severodvinsk, introduced into service in the Northern Fleet in 2013. The Severodvinsk is a 
multipurpose nuclear attack submarine armed with a wide range of conventional and nuclear 
armament, including cruise missiles for targets at sea and ashore, and weapons for ASW. The 
Russian Navy plans a procurement of eight to ten of the fourth generation submarine to 
replace current SSNs and SSGNs. The tremendously expensive submarine is close to as quiet 
as contemporary American SSNs, and thought to be equal or even better in some aspects of its 
design, and consequently seen as a very challenging threat to NATO (Hicks et al., 2016, pp. 
9-11; Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015, p. 18; Tamnes, 2016, pp. 24-25).  
Third, the Russian Navy has a fleet of auxiliary submarines operated by the Directorate for 
Deep Sea Research (GUGI). Although special purpose operations is clouded in secrecy, it is 
suggested that The Northern Fleet has as many as nine nuclear powered special mission 
submarines (SSAN) in total, although it is unclear on how many are actually operational. The 
special mission submarines, including tele-operated and unmanned underwater vehicles 
(UUVs) are capable of manipulating objects on the sea floor. These capabilities and 
subsurface activities might indicate that Russia intends to intercept sensitive communications, 
destroy and exploit undersea infrastructure such as transatlantic cables, or place acoustic 
intelligence capabilities near sensitive Western military infrastructure (Hicks et al., 2016) 
(Hicks et al., 2016, p. 12). These submarines also contribute to Russia’s Arctic research, 
performing geophysical and hydrographical surveys supporting Russian claims towards the 
continental shelf (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2017, p. 180). 
Introduction of long-range precision guided missiles represent perhaps the most profound 
change of offensive capabilities for the Russian Armed Forces. For the Russian Navy and 
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consequently the Northern Fleet, the most notable is the introduction of the Kalibr range of 
missiles. The system includes a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) the SS-N-30 or 3M-14 
(Russian designator), an anti-shipping cruise missile (ASCM), the SS-N-27 or 3M-54 and an 
ASW missile, the 91R. All missiles in the Kalibr family comes with vertical or inclined 
launch capability, it can launch from ground launchers as well as torpedo tubes.  
 
Figure 1: Range of Kalibr cruise missiles. Bright red color is land-attack, and dark red is anti-ship 
missiles. Note that the various size of range radius’ are because of the Mercator map projection, which 
enlarges objects closer to the poles (CSIS, 2018). 
The versatility implies that the missile likely integrates on almost any platform, reflected in 
the wide use of Kalibr on smaller Russian naval surface ships. The LACM and ASCM have 
salvo and waypoint capabilities, which means they are adapted to a wide variety of attack 
modes, complicating defensive measures for the target (McDermott & Bukkvoll, 2017, p. 13; 
Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015, p. 34).  
The Northern Fleet submarines and the introduction of long-range precision guided and 
Kalibr missiles in particular, provide a significant boost to Russian defensive and offensive 
capabilities. On the one hand, the defensive capabilities provided by the missiles could 
increase the defensive capabilities of Russia’s sea based strategic deterrence. The Bastion 
Defence Concept conceived during the Cold War introduced layered defence in the defence of 
Russian SSNBs (McDermott & Bukkvoll, 2017, p. 11).  
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Figure 2: The Reach of the Russian 'Bastion' Defence Concept (RUSI, 2016). 
Reintroduced into Russian naval strategy and essentially the same concept as during the Cold 
War, the Bastion Defence today composes of aircraft, surface ships, fixed installations and 
submarines, which aims at establishing sea control and freedom of movement for Russian 
SSBNs inside the extended Barents Sea region. The objectives of the SSNs are to establish 
sea denial operations defending the Bastion, blunting or eliminating an attack coming through 
the Norwegian Sea and GIUK (Tamnes, 2016, pp. 9-11). The extensive range and high 
precision of the ASCM enables Russian SSNs to threaten distant targets in the North Atlantic 
simultaneous to the protection of the Bastion, and by doing so interdict NATO SLOC and 
maritime operations at the North Atlantic.  
Furthermore, the LACM provides the capability to strike crucial harbour facilities and other 
bridgeheads for the transatlantic link, Command & Control and other infrastructure 
threatening NATO military operations and collective defence of Norway and its allies. Russia 
could consequently hold the entire European theatre at risk, as well as pose a threat to the US 
mainland (McDermott & Bukkvoll, 2017, pp. 11, 13-14; Williams, 2018). On the other hand 
the offensive capabilities represented by global reach, speed and concealed nature of a nuclear 
submarine combined with the Kalibr LACM, constitute a powerful and flexible first strike 
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capability for power projection, signalling and coercion. Both Russian and Western scholars 
envisage that military force becomes more ‘normal’ and usable as a political instrument for 
achieving foreign policy goals, thus lowering the threshold for coercion under the threat of 
punishment by long-range precision strike. As these weapons lower the threshold for coercive 
strategies, it opens the possibility for Russia to coerce by punitive measures pursuing regional 
or local political interests. For Russia however the challenge is to provide for a large enough 
inventory if missiles to have a credible capability, as both cost and production rate is 
challenging (McDermott & Bukkvoll, 2017, pp. 30-33).  
Since Russian submarines are able to operate covertly, launch detection and early warning 
become particularly difficult. Furthermore, with the advent of long-range precision strike 
manifested in cruise missiles in particular, denial strategies by defensive measures have 
become challenging. Point defence systems could provide for defence of a smaller geographic 
area, concerning theatre or wide-area missile defence on the other hand, the target list is just 
too long for denial. Which implies that deterrence strategies concerning long-range precision 
guided missiles increasingly emphasises punishment and pre-emptive strike as viable ways of 
defence. The challenge with punishment and pre-emptive strategies however is that it erodes 
stability unless carefully implemented into a defence strategy (Askvik, 2015, pp. 47-54; 
Karako, Payne, Roberts, Obering III, & Todorov, 2017). 
 Norwegian Security Policy 
Norway’s geostrategic proximity to Russia and the rich energy and fishery resources in the 
High North are formative of Norwegian security and defence policy. The principles of 
Norway’s security policy remain largely the same as during the Cold War, balancing the need 
for security by integration in NATO’s collective defence, while seeking to maintain low 
tension by way of a policy of reassurance towards Russia (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av 
Norge, 2015, pp. 14-19). 
Most notable in Norway’s reassurance policy are the restraints on NATO presence and 
activities in Norway and the High North. For this study, of particular interest are Norway’s 
base policy, precluding permanent stationing of allied combat forces during peacetime, and 
restraints on flights from Norwegian bases into the Barents Sea. The restrictions apply to this 
date, with some modifications. Restrictions have throughout and after the Cold War been 
subject to criticism for weakening the defence of Norway, but in terms of security policy, they 
have been considered a success (Tamnes, 2016, p. 15; Tamnes & Eriksen, 1999). 
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The integration into the Alliance is mirrored in measures such as the pre-positioning of 
material for the reception of allied reinforcements, and Norway’s contributions to US 
intelligence and early warning. Submarine surveillance in the High North has been a highly 
appraised contribution, where the P-3 Orion has played an essential role. Bilateral 
surveillance and intelligence agreements with the US, has provided Norway with technology 
for surveillance on favourable terms, in exchange for intelligence. The P-3 Orion enabled 
Norway to cover the northern parts of the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, while other 
NATO partners, in particular the US and the UK, could concentrate further west (Tamnes, 
2016, pp. 15-17). 
The Norwegian defence concept embodied in the current long-term defence plan underscores 
credible deterrence as the foundation of Norwegian security. Norway has acquired a portfolio 
of strategic or deterrent capabilities, notably submarines, F-35 aircraft and long-range 
precision guided weapons that can raise the threshold for Russian aggression and prevent 
escalation of crises. In the event Russia contemplates war with Norway, it will have to 
consider NATOs full military potential in its cost calculus. This is the cornerstone of a 
credible deterrence and defence for Norway. Given the short response times, the ability to 
provide a seamless escalation is central. Hence, integrating NATO and the US in the defence 
of Norway is fundamental. The concept rests on the ability to establish a situational awareness 
and provide intelligence, in particular maritime surveillance providing for transparency and 
predictability (Regjeringen, 2016a, p. 18; Tamnes, 2015, pp. 390-391). 
The US remains the central contributor for reinforcement of Norway in the event of war. 
Procurement of American fighter aircraft and maritime surveillance aircraft for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces strengthens the bilateral security policy link. Cooperative opportunities will 
consequently arise, which Norway should exploit for further integration. Prepared 
arrangements, training, exercises and operations are some examples of opportunities for 
further integration. Moreover, Norway’s choice to continue its maritime surveillance 
contribution facilitated by American technology could deepen the integration of what is 
considered an extremely strong bilateral relationship (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 
2015, p. 67; Tamnes, 2018, p. 17).  
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 Summary 
Russia’s assertive and expansionist conduct, subversive grand strategy and non-strategic 
nuclear weapons doctrine point to a new normal in the overall geopolitical relationship 
between Russia and NATO, where strategic stability has weakened in comparison to the Cold 
War. Russia’s military doctrine and modernization of capabilities in the Northern Fleet along 
with a more aggressive posture and conduct also indicate that the security temperature 
between Russia and NATO in the High North and the North Atlantic is falling.  
However, a military crisis between Russia and NATO in other regions causing a spillover 
effect is the most likely scenario for initiating a major military conflict in the High North. The 
prospects of a bilateral military conflict resulting from disputes over economic resources or 
territories in the Arctic are not very likely at this stage. In the event of a military conflict, 
Russia will probably give priority to protecting its strategic submarines, the backbone of 
Russia’s strategic deterrence and defence, under the Bastion Defence Concept.  
Russian attack and multipurpose submarines are key in defending the SSBN Bastion, and will 
most likely conduct interdict operations against NATO SLOC and the transatlantic link. With 
the Kalibr missile systems, Russia is able to defend the Bastion with more depth and 
flexibility, and threaten the transatlantic link from well outside the horizon of a transiting 
NATO force. Of equal importance is the land-attack capability of the Kalibr missiles that 
enables Russia to hold the European and US mainland at risk, threatening NATO land and air 
components. Moreover, Kalibr missiles provides Russia with coercive instruments. Missile 
defence systems do not currently provide any wide-area capability to deny long-range 
precision guided cruise missile attacks, pre-emptive strategies consequently appear as the 
remaining deterrent measure. These developments cause a security dilemma for NATO, 
consequently rising concerns regarding crisis stability. 
The relationship to Russia is formative in Norwegian defence policy and will remain so. 
NATO constitutes the core of Norway’s deterrence, while reassurance remains fundamental in 
Norway’s efforts to maintain low tension towards its more powerful neighbour. The security 
challenges currently posed by Russia points to a deeper Norwegian integration to NATO. The 
main reasons are Russia’s strategic mobility, submarines and long-range precision guided 
missiles that constitute a compression of time and space. Norway’s integration into the 
Alliance aims at increasing the responsiveness to emerging crises and provide for seamless 
escalation, which depends on intelligence and early warning.  
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Chapter 5. Operational Significance of the P-8 and the Trilateral 
Partnership 
Chapter five analyses the capabilities of the new aircraft as well as the added contribution of 
the trilateral cooperation between the US, UK and Norway, and concludes that the P-8 
provides quantitative and qualitative improvements to ASW and ISR capabilities. The 
quantitative improvements relate to improved sensors and aircraft design, whereas a new 
operations concept and network capabilities represent qualitative progress in ASW and ISR. 
The key operational significance of the trilateral partnership is that it will enhance collective 
defence by increasing the ability to sustain high-end ASW operations. The arguments and 
conclusions of this chapter are the basis for the analysis of deterrence and crisis stability in 
chapter six. 
 P-8 Capabilites 
According to the Norwegian Government, MPAs are strategic assets that contribute to 
building a strong national ability to sustain situational awareness and maritime surveillance. 
The aircraft are essential in providing Norwegian authorities with a solid foundation for 
decision-making. Sustained capabilities in surveillance and ASW are also important to NATO 
and close allies. In the bilateral relationship with USA, the Norwegian MPAs are key 
contributors to operational cooperation. With its modern sensors and weapons, the new MPAs 
represent a continuation and improvement to these abilities (Regjeringen, 2016a, p. 65). 
The P-8 aircraft will represent considerable improvements in ISR and ASW capabilities. 
There are particularly three specific features of the Poseidon that set it significantly apart from 
previous MPAs, these are presence, wide-area surveillance, as well as network capabilities, 
thus subjects for further examination. 
Presence is the the most pressing issue with Norway’s current MPAs. Presence is a 
prerequisite for maintaining a leading position and competence in the High North, as it 
provides situational awareness for Norway and the Alliance. Range and endurance make 
MPAs particularly suited platforms to maintain a Norwegian presence in the High North, and 
consequently constitutes a strategic resource for Norway in asserting its interests. According 
to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters’ Chief of Operations, Brigadier General Leif 
Sommerseth, the Norwegian MPAs presence is today well below the required level as aircraft 
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availability is unsatisfactory for the P-3 fleet. However, the P-8 is expected to change this 
(Sommerseth, 2018). 
Norway acquires five Poseidon aircraft to replace four ASW capable P-3 Orion’s and two 
DA-20 Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft. The number of aircraft acquired could be seen as 
insufficient, and it could be argued that the ability to maintain a presence in the High North 
will not be improved or even sustained. There are however several reasons as to why the P-8 
could provide a better operational availability, despite the relative reduction of airframes. 
The aircraft design and logistics concept are key reasons why the P-8 could provide a higher 
operational availability. In addition, an open-architecture design concept allowing capability 
growth with less impact on aircraft downtime should have a positive impact. The P-8 design 
concept has capability growth in mind, allowing the aircraft to be upgraded with little 
downtime. Whereas previous aircraft designs, such as the P-3 and DA-20, generally require 
substantial rebuild and redesign for upgrades and capability developments.  
Moreover, parts are increasingly unobtainable for Norwegian P-3 aircraft and prolonged 
periods on the ground are to be expected. The British Government assumed 70 % operational 
availability for the now retired Nimrod MR2. The Nimrod MR2 is somewhat comparable to 
the P-3s with respect to overall availability. However, the Norwegian P-3 aircraft incorporates 
customized sensor solutions and is a substantially smaller fleet of aircraft. Making it even 
more challenging to sustain, likely taking the availability further below 70 %. The P-8 on the 
other hand has an expected availability of 85%. The main reasons for the increased 
availability is that the aircraft design is based on a well proven commercial airliner that 
provides for high reliability, and between Norway, the UK and the US, a fleet of identical 
aircraft improves parts logistics by economies of scale (Aas, 2017, p. 75; A. L. Roberts, 
2018). 
The US Navy operates the P-8 worldwide today, and particularly its operational availability 
has received appraisal (Jane's, 2014, p. 4; Rogoway, 2017). The P-8 Norwegian Project 
Coordinator, Torgeir Aas, says that the P-8 is to double the amount of flight hours compared 
to the Orion, and also simultaneously maintain the operations portfolio of the EW aircraft 
fleet requiring one thousand flight hours a year (Aas, 2017, p. 78). The P-8 will consequently 
provide improved operational availability even with the relative reduction in aircraft. 
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As the P-8 improves operational availability, two factors are of interest regarding presence. 
One is responsiveness and the ability to establish an immediate presence in a crisis, which is a 
result of the distance to the area of interest and speed to get there. The other is area coverage, 
i.e. for how long and how far away the aircraft can sustain its presence, determined by aircraft 
endurance and range. 
First, as basing for Norwegian MPAs remains a controversial issue after the Parliament chose 
Evenes over Andøya as the main operating base, the response time increases as Evenes is 
further away from the Norwegian areas of interest in the Barents Sea. On the other hand, the 
P-8 has a considerably higher cruise speed than the P-3. At 490 knots, the P-8 cruises almost 
50 % faster than its predecessor, and a Poseidon taking off from Evenes would reach 
Bjørnøya almost 15 minutes before a P-3 from Andøya. The difference to Novaya Zemlya is 
45 minutes in favour of the P-8 with a flight time of 1 hours and 30 minutes. During a 
developing crisis or situation that requires responsiveness, the Poseidon will consequently get 
there faster, and the change of base location has a minor impact. 
Second, stated endurance for the Poseidon and Orion varies, as it depends on operational 
pattern, type of mission and operational altitude. However, various sources imply a maximum 
endurance of 10-11 hours for the Poseidon and 12-13 hours for the P-3 (A. L. Roberts, 2018). 
The operational implication is that more sorties could be required with the P-8 to sustain a 
persistent physical presence. On the other hand, with its increased speed the Poseidon will 
have less transit time, thus more of its total mission time on-station. In addition to its 
estimated range, exceeding the Orion by 15-20 % (Rogoway, 2017).  
Consequently, the P-8 provides for larger surveillance areas due to increased range, and 
covers it quicker due to superior speed. The lesser endurance is negligible in terms of 
operational significance. Moreover, the Poseidons Air-to-Air refuelling (AAR) capability 
could extend the aircraft’s range and endurance. Norway has joined NATOs Multinational 
Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF), and the rollout of Airbus A330 multi role tanker 
transport aircraft could help sustain persistent P-8 operations, although probably prioritized 
for fighter aircraft operations (Leone, 2017; NATO, 2017b). Consequently, the P-8 will 
provide for increased responsiveness and ability to sustain presence over a larger operational 
area, even without airborne refuelling. With inflight-refuelling, range and endurance 
obviously improve additionally. 
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Wide-area surveillance capability is the second merit of the P-8 aircraft that requires 
attention. The P-8 boasts a comparable setup of electronic and acoustic sensors as the P-3. 
Hence, the P-8 could be a quantitative advancement in capability due to developments in 
sensor technology (Håvold, 2015, p. 32). Although largely equipped with comparable sensors, 
the Poseidon is regarded a significant and qualitative leap forward, “a step-change in MPA 
capability” especially regarding ASW and ISR. (Jane's, 2014, p. 4; 2017, p. 2). The step-
change represented by a different conceptual approach to MPA operations takes advantage of  
 
Figure 3: P-8A Poseidon (Boeing, 2014). 
airpower’s key attributes, height, reach and speed to improve surveillance. The wide-area 
surveillance capability is arguably one of two main features that qualitatively set the aircraft 
apart from legacy MPA, the other factor is network capabilities, discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Wide-area surveillance is a central capability requirement, ushered by the US Navy that 
influenced the P-8 concept and design. As the Poseidon in 2004 was chosen to replace the US 
Navy P-3, it brought with it a High Altitude ASW (HAASW) concept that was notably 
different from previous approaches to MPA ASW operations. The typical ASW mission as 
practiced by the P-3 was low-level operations conducted at 200 feet or below. The primary 
reasons for the low-level ASW concept were sonobuoy and torpedo designs that at that 
technological stage did not have the precision to track an enemy submarine and allow a 
successful attack from altitude. The introduction of GPS-aided sonobuoy positioning and 
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GPS-guided ASW weapons changed that and enabled a High Altitude ASW concept (Håvold, 
2015, p. 34). 
The Multi-Static Active Coherent (MAC) is the primary wide-area acoustic search system of 
the P-8. Contrary to traditional wide-area search tactics with passive sonobuoys, MAC utilizes 
both active and passive sonobuoys in a multi-static network to extend detection ranges and 
enable wide-area sub-surface search, detection and localization. Although technical 
challenges related to processing has raised some concerns on multi-static developments, many 
navies see multi-static as the predominant way ahead, and the Joint Air Power Competence 
Centre says that it is one of the most viable future detection methods for airborne platforms 
(DOT&E, 2015; JAPCC, 2016, p. 41).  
Passive tactics has traditionally provided MPA’s with wide-area ASW search capability, and 
detection ranges of passive sonobuoys were during the 1970s and 1980s, commonly measured 
in miles. Because of a noisier oceans and quieter submarines, detection ranges are now 
reduced to a few hundred yards for the quietest designs, and the relative noise ratio is 
increasingly favouring the submarine. Simple physics imply that a halving the sensor range 
equates to four times as many buoys for a similar sized search area. Thus is searching for 
modern submarines today extremely intensive in terms of sonobuoys. Moreover, processing 
power places limitations on the amount of sonobuoys processed simultaneously by the P-3. 
Consequently is the effective search area considerably reduced, and a move away from 
passive tactics for wide-area ASW is becoming necessary (JAPCC, 2016, pp. 38-41).  
Although MAC reinstates a wide-area ASW surveillance capability, the traditional passive 
search tactics comes with a couple of advantages that active and multi-static systems struggle 
to achieve. One is that passive systems does not emit sound, thus enables covert tracking of 
submarines. The other and more importantly is Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT). ACINT 
enables identification of individual submarine classes, even specific hulls in certain cases, 
based on acoustic noise signatures from the submarine. ACINT could prove particularly 
important for separating friend from foe in ASW. As it enables discrimination of SSBNs from 
SSGNs, SSNs and SSKs, it is consequently key to recognizing type of threat and 
identification for weapons engagement (Håvold, 2015, pp. 6, 9; JAPCC, 2016, p. 41). 
A leap in the on-board processing power permits the P-8 to process up to 64 sonobuoys, twice 
the amount of the P-3 (Boeing, 2017). The P-8 could consequently conduct submarine 
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surveillance in a considerable larger area than its predecessor does. Assuming that MAC 
constitutes double the detection range that of traditional passive buoys. The subsurface area 
coverage for the P-8 becomes eight times larger than that of the P-3. The analysis might seem 
overly optimistic in favour of the Poseidon, but doubling the range is actually a rather 
conservative estimate.  
Moreover, as MAC utilizes a combination of active transmitter and a network of passive 
sensors, it mitigates the noise ratio problem with purely passive systems, denying the 
submarine the ability to hide in a noisy environment. As the P-8 also has a passive capability, 
it enables ACINT, and with the increased search capability provided by the MAC the total 
surveillance and warfare capability constitute a considerable improvement. MAC will thus 
increase the overall effectiveness in ASW and sub-surface ISR, particularly by the augmented 
search capacity, widening the search area. 
Furthermore, the P-8 has a wide range of non-acoustic sensors represented by the AN/APY10 
maritime surveillance radar, MX-20HD digital electro-optical and infrared sensor (EO/IR) 
and the AN/ALQ-240(V)1 electronic support system (ESM) and AN/ALQ-213(V) electronic 
warfare management system (EWS). Although the non-acoustic sensors primarily are for 
surface targets, they play an important part in ASW operations as well. Characteristic for non-
acoustic sensors is that, with increased altitude, they increase range and provide better 
coverage (Håvold, 2015, p. 34). As the P-8 boasts a high altitude concept with considerable 
improvements in flight characteristics, the performance of the P-8 above the surface should 
also be significantly better than the P-3. 
Since the non-acoustic sensors are comparable variants of those on the P-3, they presumably 
provide quantitative improvements to the P-8. Moreover, when considering the High Altitude 
concept in conjunction with improved sensors, the operational significance is arguably 
substantial. The P-8 service ceiling is 41.000 feet. When compared to the 30.000 feet of the P-
3, there is considerable advantages in non-acoustic sensor range and coverage. A simple 
comparison of theoretical radar range and coverage shows that an aircraft at 30.000 feet will 
have a maximum theoretical range of 213 nautical miles, whereas at 41.000 feet that range 
increases to 249 nautical miles, which is 17 % more. The difference in radar coverage is 36 % 
more from the higher altitude. For the ESM system, the difference is 322 versus 377 nautical 
miles, increasing the aircraft SIGINT capability that provides passive location and 
identification of electronic emissions in the surveillance area.  
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Certainly, other limitations in acoustic, radar and ESM technology, such as antenna gain and 
size, submarine developments and other factors determine the effective surveillance coverage. 
The discussion, however, makes the argument that altitude provides clear advantages for 
sensors and that the P-8 flight characteristics and wide-area surveillance concept exploit the 
advantages of airpower to a considerably larger degree than the P-3 Orion.  
Network capabilities is the third feature of the P-8 aircraft that I examine. The Poseidon’s 
network capability facilitates for sharing a timely and accurate information exchange based on 
integrated networks. John Boyd’s OODA-loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) as it illustrates 
the importance of decision-speed as a competitive advantage on the battlefield, and crucial to 
winning over the enemy. And, it is according to NATO, critical to provide decision-makers 
with timely and accurate information to facilitate a credible deterrence posture faced with the 
current strategic challenges (NATO, 2016b; Osinga, 2007, pp. 1-2, 315).  
There are particularly two merits concerning network capabilities that deserve examination. 
First, I turn the attention to the operational significance of the Poseidon’s network 
capabilities. Second, I discuss the feasibility of networked operations for Norway and NATO 
in the High North, since networked operations depend on more than just the capabilities of the 
aircraft.  
First, concerning the operational significance the P-8 network capabilities. In view of Russian 
submarines and long-range precision cruise missiles threats, the most notable are integration, 
indications and warnings and Joint ASW. 
Integration by network capabilities could on the one hand improve the capabilities of Norway 
Armed Forces and national resilience during an attack. The timeframe from a security crisis 
becomes subject to Article V discussions in the NAC, to Transfer of Authority (TOA) from 
the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) to NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) is 
uncertain. Defending national territory against enemy operations while awaiting NAC 
consensus, activation of Article V and military reinforcement of Norway, may require that 
Norway initially conduct national joint operations (Forsvaret, 2014, pp. 33-34), in which a 
networked integration of Norway’s combat capabilities and the P-8 could facilitate for 
improvements to Norway’s situational awareness, combat resilience and targeting process. 
At the tactical level, network capabilities could increase the ability to search for and detect 
enemy entities by allowing cross cueing of sensors, weapons and shared situational 
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awareness, thus widening the surveillance area. One example is the F-35, boasting an Active 
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar with surface and SAR capabilities, in conjunction 
with electro-optics capable of surface track and targeting, an ESM suite and sensor fusion. 
Although not an obvious ASW asset the F-35’s sensor suite could provide valuable cueing to 
the P-8 for ASW purposes (Tørrisplass, 2017a, pp. 35-36).  
On the other hand, network capabilities could also enable seamless transition to collective 
defence. Interoperability and a shared near-real time situational awareness may be one of the 
most fundamental capabilities for a seamless transition collective defence. A national C4ISR 
infrastructure and Norwegian force components like the P-8, equipped and proficient in 
networked defence, will arguably contribute to a seamless transition from national to NATO 
command. The establishment of NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) in 
2012, the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and the Federated Mission Networking (FMN) as 
well as the JISR initiative underscore the importance of networking capabilities for NATO. 
Integrating Norway’s force structure accordingly by network capabilities is consequently a 
prerequisite for a seamless transition from national to allied operations (NATO ACT, 2015; 
NATO NCIA, 2014).  
Indications and Warnings is likely one of the most important contributions of Norwegian 
MPAs in the High North. The network capability could be key given the implications of 
increased strategic responsiveness and agility of the Russian forces. Especially long-range 
precision strike capabilities that by compressing time and space have set the stage for short 
alert times. As the time from strategic decisions to tactical actions has become a matter of 
minutes and seconds, swift decisions is consequently of great importance (Regjeringen, 
2016a, p. 29; Søreide, 2014, p. 105). Two important features of networking stands out in this 
context.  
First is the ability to establish a comprehension of developments in the wider strategic sense. 
Events occurring within a narrow timeframe, separated by distance, could provide indications 
on broader strategic developments. Pre-positioning of submarines in the North Atlantic and 
air defence systems activity at the Kola Peninsula, in the event Russia is preparing to establish 
the Bastion, provides two examples. As both the P-8 and the F-35 boast network capability, 
the combined sensor coverage of the aircraft could provide strategic surveillance, and 
disseminate accurate and near real-time intelligence to decision-makers at the operational and 
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strategic level for indications and warning of a developing security crisis or war. This would 
enable strategic situational awareness in near real-time.  
Second is the ability to respond. Once a surprise attack is imminent it is of particular interest 
to Norway and NATO to establish missile defence at strategic locations, like the F-35 base at 
Ørland, and have the F-35 aircraft airborne to prevent neutralization of a crucial deterrence 
capability for Norway (Askvik, 2015, pp. 58-62). The significance of network capabilities is 
consequently that the P-8 is able to provide decision-makers with launch detection and 
awareness, and consequently provide for immediate response options as networking reduces 
time form observation to action. Furthermore, if a near real-time common operational picture 
is provided for the joint operational headquarters and the strategic level, the chain of 
command likely increases its agility and responsiveness, thus reducing the risk of strategic 
paralysis (Pedersen, 2014, p. 83; Warden III, 2011, p. 71). 
 
Figure 4: P-8 Networked surveillance (Boeing, 2013). 
Networked defence capabilities could consequently enable a scale and resolution in 
surveillance as well as the speed and integration of information required for a comprehensive 
situational awareness, by joining a range of sensors into a comprehensive common 
operational picture. Furthermore, it could provide for early warning and response options in 
case of a surprise attack, by compressing observation to action time for the defender. 
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Joint ASW is a key capability for allied defence against Russian submarine threats, where the 
P-8 is a central component and network capabilities will have significant operational 
influence. A high-end joint ASW effort aims at denying enemy submarines freedom of 
operation by exploiting the combination of different sensors and platform characteristics. This 
layered approach is regarded as the most efficient way of defending against enemy 
submarines (JAPCC, 2016, pp. 12-16, 57).  
Due to the long-range strike capabilities of Russian submarines, Joint ASW is ever more 
likely to be a theatre-wide effort. It should be noted that the concept of Joint ASW is far from 
new. However, the introduction of long-range precision guided missiles has fundamentally 
changed the characteristics of the ASW theatre, so the added complexity demands more from 
a situational awareness perspective, which consequently makes network capabilities 
favourable. The network capabilities of the P-8 will have operational impact on JASW for 
four reasons. 
One, the ability to tap into the tactical situational awareness before coming on-station and 
relieving the off-going MPA, is paramount to be effective in prosecuting submarines once on-
station and sustain an uninterrupted effort. Of particular interest is the ability to exchange 
sensor information between systems in contact with the enemy submarine, so that the on-
coming aircraft is instantly able to prosecute the submarine, reducing the chance of lost 
contact. 
Two, as ASW operations traditionally was confined in separate theatres of operations, the 
implication of Russia’s long-range precision guided submarine missiles and air defence 
systems in the Bastion, is that Joint Theatre ASW forces now could be subject to threat from 
the entire theatre. By enabling a theatre-wide situational awareness, the P-8 could play a vital 
role in mitigating ASW force vulnerability by early warning, as well as enable operations 
aimed at destroying or suppressing enemy anti-access/area denial systems by contributing to 
joint targeting. 
Three, the advantages of altitude and connectivity makes the Poseidon adept as a node for 
unmanned systems. Altitude enables greater ranges of communications to both UUVs and 
UAVs. Moreover, as unmanned systems come into service there could be good reason to use 
surface ships in other roles than ASW for vulnerability reasons, and the MPA would for the 
foreseeable future likely be the only long-range ASW platform with complete kill chain 
capabilities.  (Massenburg, 2016).  
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Fourth, the P-8 boasts a high altitude ASW weapons capability (HAAWC). HAAWC enables 
the aircraft to launch wing-kit equipped torpedoes from altitude, with options for in-flight 
mid-course updates or re-targeting. The weapon is designed to glide a substantial horizontal 
distance, providing a standoff capability and reducing missile threats to the aircraft. The 
Poseidon’s agility implies that it could provide superior re-armament capabilities over sea-
based units. Consequently, the Poseidon likely becomes the favourable choice for the Theatre 
Joint ASW Commander for torpedo engagement against enemy submarine targets. By 
 
Figure 5: High altitude anti-submarine warfare weapon capability (Rogoway, 2016a). 
sensor or targeting feed from all ASW sensors in the entire theatre, including space based 
platforms, fixed and deployable systems, the P-8 network capabilities thus provide for a third-
party targeting, substantially increasing the engagement capability of a Joint ASW force 
(Håvold, 2015, pp. 27-28; Rogoway, 2016b). 
The feasibility of networked operation for Norwegian Poseidons operating in the High North 
is questionable, however. Acronyms and definitions describing network defence concepts 
come in many shapes. While Norway uses NbF (Nettverksbasert Forsvar), NATO uses CIS 
(Communication Information Systems) and the NATO Joint Targeting doctrine refers to C4I. 
The following definition of C4ISR is fit for our purpose: “the network of platforms, sensors, 
communications nodes, and decision aids which connects systems to operators” (Humphreys, 
2017).  
Network defence has been a part of military conceptual and technological development for 
decades, and has especially been central in American military thinking as a part of RMA and 
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information superiority concepts. In the Norwegian Armed Forces, however, the 
manifestation has been rather slow. Once thought to revolutionize warfare it has become more 
of an evolution, and even though there has been an increase in information flow and 
communication capabilities, the development largely constitutes a gradual improvement of 
cooperation in joint operations (Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge, 2015, p. 33). 
The postponed revolution of NbF is caused largely by challenges in agreeing on a common 
inter-service and platform architecture as well as the lack of access to wideband satellite 
communications, especially in the High North. The latter might be the tallest obstacle as 
space-based systems has been the prerogative of the major military powers due to cost and 
technology. Nonetheless, in the dispersed areas of the High North and the maritime areas of 
the North Atlantic, satellites are the only communication carriers capable of bandwidths 
sufficient for networked defence, and consequently a requirement to sustain a near real-time 
network capability for the P-8 in the High North (Pedersen, 2014, pp. 82-83; Regjeringen, 
2016a, p. 35; 2017b). 
There are however no available satellite systems that could provide the required 
communications services. In June 2018, however, the Parliament decided to establish two 
satellites under Norwegian governmental control in high elliptic orbit (HEO) providing a 24-
hour wide-band satellite communications (WBSC) support to the Norwegian Armed Forces 
and allies in the High North. When seen in conjunction with the expressed governmental 
ambitions for early warning and establishment of a corroborative situational awareness at all 
levels for the defence sector, the HEO project indicates that network capabilities is a priority 
for defence purposes in the High North (Dimmen, 2018, p. 2; Regjeringen, 2017b; Space 
Norway, 2018).  
Furthermore, the US Air Force would like to use the Norwegian HEO satellites for hosting 
sensors, and Norway has acquired the F-35 and P-8, systems that are designed with networked 
interoperability in mind. Consequently there is a strong strategic incentive to establish 
complex and costly C4ISR infrastructures for Norway and its allies in the High North 
(USSTRATCOM, 2017; Weisgerber, 2018). The launch, planned for 2022-2023, enables 
Norway and its allies with a future C4ISR communications capability that likely supports 
network capabilities for the P-8. 
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 The Operational Significance of the Trilateral Partnership 
MPAs remain a primary asset for theatre-wide surveillance due to its range and 
responsiveness, and is fundamental to provide long-range indicators and warnings. While the 
three nations in the North Atlantic Poseidon partnership are investing in new MPAs, the total 
number of MPAs will be reduced compared to Cold War inventories. Fewer MPA airframes 
could pose a challenge (Defence Committe, 2012, p. 45; JAPCC, 2016, pp. 46, 87-88; 
Massenburg, 2016) . 
Accepting gaps in submarine surveillance is problematic even in peacetime as it weakens the 
protection of a task force in transition to crisis response (JAPCC, 2016, pp. 48-49). The 
trilateral partnership should enhance the theatre-wide ASW and surveillance capability 
against Russian submarine operations in the North Atlantic. As the three nations acquire 
identical versions of the Poseidon, interoperability opens up to a range of accommodations 
that would likely increase presence, surveillance and ASW capabilities.  
The most obvious that deserves merit is doctrine, training, as well as bases, logistics and 
facilities. These three issues will be examined in the following. 
NATOs has a range of doctrines containing procedures for joint ASW, which aims at 
integrating the different nation’s maritime airpower and fleets under common procedures. For 
several reason NATO ASW doctrine has become obsolete. Although NATO has argued in 
favour of interoperability for decades, each nation’s choice of defence systems has largely 
been without interoperability in mind. This is true also for Norway, the UK, the US, 
concerning their MPA capabilities (Aas, 2017, p. 75). As the United States operated other 
versions of the P-3 than Norway did, the British operated the Nimrod, constructing three 
different aircraft developed on national terms.  
In addition, the non-existence of a submarine threat to NATO changed the roles for MPAs 
during the 1990s and 2000s to increasingly taking on other missions and overland ISR 
capabilities (Massenburg, 2016). Moreover, the current doctrines have not kept up to pace 
with the technological developments in ASW. Consequently, the evolution of a joint NATO 
ASW doctrine has suffered (JAPCC, 2016, pp. 46, 61; Nordenman, 2016, p. 5). As the three 
nations now acquire identical aircraft, it seems obvious to pursue a common doctrine for a 
coherent ASW effort, and according to Arild Eikeland in the Norwegian Department of 
Defence, a joint ASW doctrine spawned by the trilateral partnership will be addressed 
(Eikeland, 2018). 
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A common framework for training, the second issue examined here, will likely have positive 
impact on both interoperability and proficiency. As the UK is establishing a simulator 
complex at Lossiemouth, the future home of the British P-8, Norway is looking to do some of 
the training there (Aas, 2018). Since the Poseidon, similar to other modern military aircraft, is 
costly to operate, simulator becomes a preferred tool to train aircrews. With the choice of 
identical MPAs, and a common training framework the three nations have the potential for 
further development of common doctrine and procedures, which will pave the ground for 
closely integrated training and operations. Captain William Ellis, responsible for P-8 
operations in Europe as the USN's Commodore MPA and Reconnaissance Operations and 
Commander Task Force 67 (CTF 67), argues that a common training framework in Europe 
would offer clear benefits. 
I can tell you that having a robust training facility in theatre that we can access 
would be a tremendous benefit. There are several training events that are most 
effective when conducted in a simulator, and if a deployed squadron had 
[simulator] access they could keep their upgrading aircrew progressing through 
their syllabus vice having breaks in their training. The end result is shorter times-
to-qualify, and the pay-off is more experienced and effective aircrews on station 
(Jane's, 2017, pp. 8-9) 
As high-end joint ASW are intensive operations, they require the highest level of proficiency. 
Hence could a simulator capability, allowing the three partners training alongside each other, 
have invaluable impact on operational effectiveness. It facilitates for interoperability-training 
in the most complex environments, including aspects that are out of reach for real-live 
exorcises, like weapons engagement (Klevberg, 2012, p. 288). 
Close cooperation on bases, logistics and facilities is the third issue examined. Enabling host-
based operations could offer significant operational flexibility and agility by enabling the 
three nations MPAs’ use of whatever base is closest to the operations area. The operational 
significance is reduced transit distance to the operations area thus increasing the time on-
station, as well as improved responsiveness. The location of Evenes, Lossiemouth and 
Keflavik in ‘each corner’ of the Norwegian Sea and GIUK, consequently provide for ample 
access to the North Atlantic. 
The simultaneous deployment of numerous Russian submarine in order to inflict on NATO 
operations or exercises, last seen during NATO’s exorcise Trident Juncture, is likely a modus 
operandi to continue. Sustained 24/7 MPA operations are thus becoming fundamental to 
establish a persistent and thus credible high-end ASW surveillance capability, and of crucial 
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importance to address the current challenges posed by Russian submarines. The multiple 
number of Russian submarines however will likely require more resources than constituted by 
the combined P-8 fleets of Norway and the UK during surges of activity (JAPCC, 2016, pp. 
57-58; Stormark, Hattrem, & Olsen, 2018).  
A 24/7 MPA coverage of a single submarine datum given a one hour transit time to on-
station, will require 3-4 operationally available P-8s taking turns (A. L. Roberts, 2018). 
 
Figure 6: One hour range with the P-8A Poseidon. Note that the various size of range radius’ are 
because of the Mercator map projection, which enlarges objects closer to the poles (Rekstad, 2018). 
Considering the assumed operational availability of 85 % and a total fleet of 14 aircraft points 
to a theoretical capacity to prosecute 3-4 submarine datum’s simultaneously. Moreover, 
MPAs are national strategic resources, and both countries could have to prioritize national 
operations. Hence, hard-pressed national priorities could draw MPA’s away from allied ASW 
requirements (Defence Committe, 2018, pp. 8-9; JAPCC, 2016, p. 57). 
Adding to the British MPA capacity challenges is the support to two new aircraft carriers 
(CVA), that in the absence of sufficient numbers of surface and sub-surface escort will require 
continues cover by at least two MPAs per CVA group. On top of that comes the Joint 
Commander’s ISR requirements that during the past two decades have become a highly 
prioritized task for the MPAs (JAPCC, 2016, p. 56). Acknowledging these circumstances, the 
UK Government is investigating the need for acquiring an additional six aircraft, as 
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indications are that nine is insufficient (Defence Committe, 2018). Even if the British acquires 
additional six aircraft, there is still reason to believe that the total toll is too heavy a burden to 
bear by Norway and the UK for sustained surveillance of the Northern fleet submarines. 
Retired General Lieutenant and former Chief of Norwegian Intelligence Service Kjell 
Grandhagen assesses that the Norwegian and British will be permanently present in the North 
Atlantic, while the American presence will be of a more intermittent character (Grandhagen, 
2018). 
A host-base sustainment concept could mitigate the MPA capacity gap in the North Atlantic 
by providing for a strategic agility and responsiveness. As a majority of American MPAs 
operates in Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, the host-base sustainment opens up the 
possibility for the US Navy to prioritize aircraft between theatres. The 4.500+ nautical mile 
range and speed of the Poseidon, means the P-8 is well adapted for inter-theatre deployments. 
The US Navy already employs a rotational concept with Sigonella as a European ‘hub’ and 
Keflavik as the North Atlantic ‘spoke’ (Jane's, 2017, p. 5). Widening the scope to include 
Evenes and Lossiemouth as two more spokes would strengthen the NATO ASW defence 
capabilities. A concept that enables American MPAs to support North Atlantic operations 
provides, according to Eikeland, a unique surge capability and should be seen in context with 
the large areas of responsibility and that the overall MPA resources are not in any abundance. 
(Eikeland, 2018). 
The level of interoperability provided by the Poseidon and the trilateral framework lay the 
foundation for a possible host-base support concept providing cross servicing of P-8 aircraft 
across the North Atlantic. The ambition level currently set for Norway is to train Norwegian 
personnel, so that a cross servicing capability is established up to a level where aircraft 
servicing and minor fault repairs can be done as a host base service, the aim is to ease 
operations from each other’s MPA bases in the operations area (Aas, 2018). 
Despite having considerable sustainment in situ there are likely logistics challenges following 
such a concept. Sonobuoys expenditure could be as high as 130 buoys for each mission. 
Distance to the operations area and sonobuoy payload capacity are governing factors that 
usually dictates on-station times of around four hours on-station. Consequently, as many as 7-
800 buoys could be expended daily and somewhere around 5000 per week for one single 
datum. This requires large stockpiles of buoys. As sonobuoy unit cost has risen and the 
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sonobuoy stockpiles no longer are at Cold War levels, it has led to reductions in national buoy 
inventories.  
Consequently, national restrictions on buoy expenditure has caused inexperienced crews to 
become hesitant and too conservative in employing buoys, resulting in lost contact during 
submarine prosecution (JAPCC, 2016, p. 40). A partnership could provide advantages in 
sonobuoy procurement, such as allowing larger production lines that would lower unit cost 
and facilitate stockpiling, thus mitigate crew hesitancy. Moreover, it strengthens the ability to 
resupply buoys in the theatre rapidly by airlift. The latter could be critical as shifting areas of 
operations during high-end ASW dictate the expenditure on each base. Commander 
MARCOM in NATO Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone underscores that the US is critical for 
resilient sustainment of high-end ASW operations, while pointing to sonobuoys as one of the 
particularly critical items (Johnstone, 2018). 
Mission support facilities is the other critical component to MPA operations that could pose a 
sustainment challenge. Mission support centres (MSC) or tactical support centres (TSC) play 
an increasingly important role in MPA operations, especially as the information requirements 
of the aircraft and command structures have become more demanding. In the past, MSCs 
were able to support MPAs from any nation, and had for instance acoustic data from a landing 
aircraft analysed, processed and disseminated across the MPA and entire ASW force 
intelligence system. Several nation’s MPAs were during the past two decades developed for 
over-land ISR collection, and the advent of the digital age commercial technology enabled a 
development of MPAs and mission support without interoperability considerations. Hence a 
mutual support is no longer the standard (JAPCC, 2016, pp. 72-73).  
For the Poseidon the Tactical Operations Centre (TOC) could provide mutual MSC support, 
at least across Poseidon operators. The TOC is a part of the P-8 acquisition and an integrated 
part of the Poseidon’s capabilities, essential for extracting the full potential of the surveillance 
and intelligence capabilities of the system. Moreover, it is also an irreplaceable link in 
directing ASW resources in the theatre-wide search efforts, as its post mission analysis 
capabilities enable the determination of aircrew success in prosecution, as well as 
confirmation of tactics, environmental assessment and analysis of the possible whereabouts of 
the target. Having that capability is absolutely critical to multi-national prosecution and 
direction of MPA ASW efforts (JAPCC, 2016, p. 73). 
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The challenge is that the TOC and mutual support are facing national restrictions. According 
to Aas, the national restrictions on classified data is hard to come by, and systems that are 
classified as Norwegian national only, are difficult to integrate with foreign nations (Aas, 
2018). It could be that the close integration in a trilateral partnership, might overcome such 
classification issues. However much of the intelligence gathered through a variety of sources 
has, according to Grandhagen, such a high value for exchange that it would be unwise for 
Norway to share it automatically as a part of a trilateral partnership. Hence, should rather be 
dealt with on a bilateral basis (Grandhagen, 2018). 
The solution for Norway is to bring a mobile Tactical Operations Centre (MTOC), a 
deployable mission support concept consisting of one or two containers. As the US and UK 
navies also have MTOCs, they would have to bring their own TOCs when they deploy to 
Evenes. As the concept of MOTC containers allows for air transport, the responsiveness is 
likely slightly impaired. Base infrastructure does still have to be prepared to receive and 
house the MTOCs. However, the MTOC require significant logistics to move from one 
location to the other, which could impair operational and strategic agility. Consequently, the 
US Navy is looking into a downsized and limited capability for short duration deployments, a 
concept that may spawn a solution for its partners as well (Wheeler, 2017, pp. 7-8). A cross 
base sustainment that enables a full data exchange capability for P-8 would require a complete 
MTOC and consequently robust logistics sustainment capability. With other logistical 
challenges like sonobuoys, a permanent TOC structure that allows for mutual support would 
have been preferable during high-end ASW operations, as it would reduce the logistical needs 
(Aas, 2017, p. 78; Pierce, 2013). 
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 Summary 
The P-8A Poseidon aircraft will represent a quantitative improvement in presence and a 
qualitative leap in ASW and ISR in the High North. Its speed and range make it a more agile 
and responsive platform than the P-3 Orion, and the availability of operational aircraft 
reinstates the MPA capacity at a higher level. By assessing merely the array of sensors, the 
aircraft represent quantitative improvements, as it boasts largely the same range of sensors as 
its predecessor. However, the combination of improvements in sensor capabilities, 
introduction of new subsurface systems, a changed concept and network capabilities, 
constitutes qualitative advances of the Poseidon’s ASW and ISR capabilities. 
The MAC system aims at re-enabling a wide area sub-surface surveillance capability, which 
together with a high-altitude ASW concept provides for a continuous high altitude and wide-
area surveillance capability. Continuous high altitude operations, combined with the aircraft’s 
increased operational altitude constitute unprecedented surveillance capabilities in all three 
surveillance domains, below, at and above the surface. Due to these capabilities, there will be 
qualitative leaps in surveillance performance. 
A second feature that represents a qualitative leap in capability is the Poseidon’s network 
capabilities that enables a comprehensive, accurate and timely situational awareness for all 
command levels and decision-makers. Moreover, networked capabilities open for engaging 
the F-35 as well as other platforms with the P-8 in cross cueing of weapons and sensors. 
Exploiting the network capabilities of the aircraft requires C4ISR infrastructures, not yet 
realized in Norway. Norway’s national satellite ambition, US Air Force interest in satellite 
cooperation and the fact that Norway’s F-35 and P-8 are designed for network operations, 
could provide the strategic momentum to establish C4ISR infrastructures to exploit the full 
surveillance and warfare capabilities of the aircraft. 
The trilateral partnership is a driving factor for enhancing integration. The partnership lays the 
foundation for training, exercises and operations that will integrate warfighting and 
surveillance capabilities. The sharing of bases and facilities enable flexible and responsive 
operations across the North Atlantic for the three nations. This concept also provides for 
flexible integration of American MPAs, as their presence in the North Atlantic is intermittent. 
This is for NATO of great significance, since the Norwegian and British Fleet of aircraft are 
insufficient in numbers during high surges of Russian submarines operations. 
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Chapter 6. Influence on Norwegian Security Policy 
Chapter six examines three questions: how the P-8 and the trilateral partnership could 
influence NATOs ability to establish a capable and credible deterrence towards Russia, while 
also maintaining crisis stability and providing for reassurance measures. The chapter 
concludes that the Poseidon and the trilateral partnership will have a positive impact by 
improving deterrence capability, and at the same time, primarily by leaving the Barents Sea as 
a Norwegian responsibility, providing Norway and the Alliance with flexibility and options to 
achieve crisis stability and contribute to reassurance towards Russia and low tension in the 
north. 
 Deterrence 
Deterrence involves discouraging an aggressor from armed attack or taking other unwanted 
actions. The aggressor must consequently be convinced that the defender possess capability 
and credibility to carry out the threat, and that the cost of aggression outweighs benefits 
(Mazarr, 2018, pp. 9-10). The following discussion argues that the P-8 along with a 
transatlantic partnership will likely increase NATOs deterrence capabilities and credibility. A 
capable threat is according to Quackenbush , a threat convincing the threatened that he will be 
better off if the threat does not materialise. A state facing a capable threat therefore prefers the 
status quo to conflict (Quackenbush, 2010). A credible threat is essentially about commitment 
and implementation of force (P. M. Morgan, 2003, pp. 15-16).  
The major contribution of the P-8 and the trilateral partnership is its interoperability, 
surveillance and intelligence capabilities that paves the way for allied and national integration 
with the US Navy in the North Atlantic. Integrating and committing the US Navy to NATOs 
ASW defence will be the main pillar of an allied deterrence strategy, and likely elevate the 
threshold for Russian aggress against Norway and the Alliance. With this in mind, the 
following discussion addresses the P-8 and the trilateral framework’s contribution to a 
deterrence strategy. 
During the Cold War, NATOs protection of the SLOC from Soviet attack submarines implied 
a defensive ASW strategy. Soviet SSNs did not constitute a threat until positioned within 
torpedo range of a maritime force, and a submarine prosecution was therefore not required 
until the threat approached the force. Passive acoustic sensor-systems such as Sound 
Underwater Surveillance (SOSUS) provided an oceanographic transparency that enabled 
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theatre-wide early indication and warnings on the whereabouts of Soviet submarines. 
Sustaining a situational awareness of subsurface threats was as such manageable in time and 
space, and provided for a deterrence by a defensive ASW strategy for the Alliance. 
Today, the introduction of Kalibr anti-shipping cruise missiles (ASCM) on Russian 
submarines, and relative displacement in submarine silencing to ambient noise ratio have 
provided modern submarine designs with the operational advantage, offering Russian 
submarines operational freedom of action. Provided targeting information, Russian 
submarines are able to launch ASCM attacks to disrupt the transatlantic SLOC from well 
outside the horizon of a transiting force (Cote, 2006, p. 35). Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles 
(LACM) also pose a threat to air and land component operations in the entire theatre of the 
joint commanders. Moreover, long-range precision guided cruise missiles also constitute a 
compression of time and space in the event of a developing situation or security crises, 
reducing response times.  
Although point defence systems exist, these missiles are very difficult to defend against once 
launched, and prevention of launch is key. As submarine launch platforms are highly mobile 
and can operate covertly a prevention of launch will require awareness of the submarine 
position at any given time (Askvik, 2015, pp. 50-51; Cote, 2006, p. 35). Hence, is a defensive 
ASW strategy no longer suited to deter Russian submarine aggression, except for close 
protection of surface forces and convoys. Consequently, NATO needs to demonstrate the 
ability to “track Russian submarines at will, no matter where they are”, and impose 
unacceptable cost it be required (Foggo III & Fritz, 2016). This translates to a ‘hold at risk’ 
ASW strategy and implies a forward presence of ASW forces, hence a more offensive ASW 
posture and composure, which could influence crisis stability as discussed later in this 
chapter.  
The P-8’s wide-area surveillance and network capabilities is likely to provide an 
unprecedented ASW and ISR capability compared to legacy aircraft and other surveillance 
assets. Moreover, the trilateral framework for surge capability represent a significant 
contribution that could provide for a continuous surveillance of Russian submarines in the 
North Atlantic. Moreover, the added ASW capability by MAC, the high altitude concept and 
torpedo standoff capability means that the P-8 provides a complete kill chain capability 
against submarines (Massenburg, 2016). Eikeland says that “although the P-8 is not an 
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obvious asset for deterrence, it likely has a deterrent effect by its presence, and that the ability 
to track submarines and complete the kill chain, could have a certain effect” (Eikeland, 2018).  
It seems less likely that the Poseidon or the trilateral arrangement could have a direct 
influence on broad deterrence, dissuading Russia by the threat of punishment or denial. The 
main reason being that, although the self-protection suite of the Poseidon could mitigate 
certain light missile threats, it is unlikely that the P-8 it is able to conduct ASW operations in 
a contested or hostile air space without escort or other means of protection. Consequently, 
would the Bastion defence, with a few exemptions like the F-35, deny NATO air operations 
and thus prevent prosecution of Russian submarines by MPA’s. Leif Sommerseth and Jan 
Ove Rygg, chief of joint operations at Norwegian Joint Headquarters and commander NAOC 
respectively, says that the Poseidon’s deterrent effect is negligible. It is likely to have little 
impact by itself on the possible aggress of Russian submarines in a looming war (Rygg, 2018; 
Sommerseth, 2018). 
In a military conflict, the P-8 can influence an adversary’s submarine capabilities. but it 
depends on other capabilities like fighter aircraft, ASW capable ships, submarines and aircraft 
in a layered Joint ASW effort to have any kind of influence on broad deterrence (Grandhagen, 
2018). The following discussion on deterrence is consequently based on the premises that the 
Poseidon’s influence on deterrence will be as part of integrated operations. 
NATO without the US could potentially play a part in managing a northern crisis scenario, 
but does not have the ASW potency to counter Russian submarine operations in the Bastion 
defence (JAPCC, 2016, p. 98). The integration of the US Navy is consequently fundamental 
to sustain both an ASW force capability and credibility. However, the obligations in response 
to China in the Asia-Pacific and the US demand for burden-sharing from its NATO partners 
could question US Navy’s commitment to a presence in the North Atlantic (Tamnes, 2016, p. 
19). The reactivation of the US Navy second fleet provides a strong signal of interest, but 
what capabilities the fleet will incorporate is not yet been decided. Any doubt of the 
commitments of the US Navy to the Alliance threatens credibility, and could be perceived by 
Russia that the threat of unacceptable cost may be abandoned (Mazarr, 2018, p. 10).  
The Poseidon defence capabilities and the trilateral partnership could however, provide for 
deeper allied commitment, hence strengthen integration, and consequently deterrence. The 
further discussion looks at three merits could that could facilitate for a stronger integration, 
interoperability, burden-sharing, and intelligence. 
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First, as interoperability enhances P-8 cooperation between the three MPA operators, the 
Norwegian and British Poseidons will also be interoperable with the US Navy fleet. Along 
with a joint doctrine for ASW, training and exercises, as well as a commitment to C4ISR 
infrastructures, Norwegian and British Poseidons could be integrated at every level with US 
Navy warfighting capabilities in the North Atlantic. The high level of interoperability 
between platforms, sensors, doctrine and command structures strengthens warfighting 
capabilities by enabling seamless integration and operations, thus enhances the capability of 
the deterrence. 
Second, the political turbulence about burden-sharing has led to a concern about the cohesion 
in the Alliance and about the credibility of the collective defence guarantee. While much of 
the focus has been on the two-percent pledge, there is also every reason to emphasise the 
quality of forces and contributions. (Binnendijk, 2018). The Poseidon addresses one of the 
most severe capability gaps in the Alliance, and constitutes an investment many NATO 
partners is unable to fit into their national defence budgets or capability requirements, and is 
according to Eikeland a good example of burden-sharing (Eikeland, 2018). The Norwegian 
acquisition, the trilateral agreement sharing common infrastructures are clear statements of 
purpose, and a catalyst for a strengthened US commitment to both Norway and the Alliance 
(Mazarr, 2018, p. 10).  
Third is intelligence. The vicinities of the Kola Peninsula constitute the Northern Fleet’s main 
area for training, exercises, tactics development and weapons testing. Norway, as a small-
state, can monitor these activities more effectively than any other allied state (Eikeland, 2018; 
Grandhagen, 2018). The intelligence retrieved in the Barents Sea is vital to deterrence for two 
main reasons (Klevberg, 2012, p. 291). One, the technical intelligence is key to stay informed 
of Russian technological and arms development and potential vulnerabilities, which is the 
foundation for the development of allied defence technology, capabilities and strategies 
(Klevberg, 2012, p. 268). Two, indications and warnings is reliant on developing a 
knowledge of Russian posture and intentions.  
It is thus fundamental that the quality of the intelligence is at the highest level, a quality that 
has historically depended on access provided by Norway and technology provided by the US. 
The strong bilateral commitment served a common purpose during the Cold War, explaining 
the close bilateral relationship to the US and often referred to as the Alliance within the 
Alliance (Klevberg, 2012, pp. 411-414). Given the circumstances and the trilateral 
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cooperation, this arrangement would serve a similar purpose today. The procurement of the P-
8 will improve Norway’s intelligence capabilities, and there is no evidence that the US and 
the UK will start operating in the Barents Sea. Hence, Norway will remain a vital collector of 
intelligence and surveillance information, benefitting from its various intelligence means and 
its P-8 operations, in peace, crisis and war. Which underscores the importance of P-8 in 
strengthening deterrence by integration. 
 Crisis Stability 
The P-8 and the transatlantic partnership could influence crisis stability in three major ways: 
By reducing the threat of a Russian pre-emptive strike, the potential for a Russian surprise 
attack to achieve fait accompli, and reducing the risk of unwarranted escalation. 
First, Norwegian P-8s could reduce the threat of a Russian pre-emptive strike. A hold at risk 
strategy that requires surveillance of Russian submarines implies a presence of allied ASW 
capabilities in the Barents Sea and near the Kola Peninsula. The composition and geographic 
posturing of an ASW force will consequently affect crises stability. A forward presence by an 
allied surface and submarine force with offensive first-strike capabilities in the Barents Sea 
could pose a first-strike threat to Russia, as the SSBNs patrol areas and key strategic 
infrastructures are situated here. An offensive and forward maritime NATO force posture 
could consequently leave Russia in a security dilemma on the notion that pre-emptive strike is 
its only viable option for self-defence.  
Increasing the distance between allied offensive first-strike capable threats and the Kola 
Peninsula could on the other hand reduce the security dilemma and increase stability. An 
allied maritime strategy for the High North could provide for stability by restricting NATOs 
offensive maritime forces in the Barents Sea during peacetime. Norway’s P-8 would be a key 
contributor by sustaining presence and surveillance in the Barents Sea and demonstrate the 
ability to “track Russian submarines at will, no matter where they are” (Foggo III & Fritz, 
2016). And although the P-8 could restrict Russian submarine activity, it does not constitute 
any strategic threat to Russia, especially not Norwegian Poseidons that are not currently 
planned with air-to-surface missile (ASM) capabilities (Eikeland, 2018).  
Norwegian Poseidons are thus likely to provide for wide-area surveillance, and its networking 
capabilities could facilitate a near-real time situational awareness for a joint ASW force 
regardless of its geographic posture. Which facilitates for the option to respond by joint ASW 
strike capabilities surging from a withdrawn geographic and into the Barents Sea should the 
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situation dictate so. Consequently preserving deterrence in terms of a ‘fleet in being’ 
presence, while sustaining crisis stability and situational awareness by Norwegian P-8s. It is 
fundamental however that the ASW deterrence capabilities are not too distant, as prolonged 
response times could present an opportunity for a surprise attack by Russia. 
Second, the P-8 and the trilateral partnership could reduce the potential of a Russian surprise 
attack and fait accompli. The partnership could influence this in several ways. The joint effort 
and the division of labour between the three countries, normally leaving the Barents Sea to 
Norway, contributes significantly to enhanced information collection. The advent of 
American and British Poseidons operating from Evenes can also be a significant signal that 
the Alliance is committed to Norway, thus raising the threshold for Russian opportunistic 
aggression.  
However, the presence of allied P-8s is presumably going to be impermanent in Norwegian 
areas if interest, at least for the American Poseidon squadrons, so for Norway there is a need 
for a concept that underscores integration. Eikeland says that one of the key aspects of the 
trilateral framework, when taking into account the limited resources, is to merge operations, 
exercises and training into a visible presence in the North Atlantic. As the partnership is 
starting to influence operational integration of other ASW platforms, procedural 
interoperability issues are likely to become a thing of the past. Consequently will the 
combination of training, exercises and operations lead to increased activity in the North 
Atlantic in the future (Eikeland, 2018). 
Third, unwarranted escalation could be the product of misconceptions and arms race. 
Choosing the correct response to a developing situation or crisis requires a thorough 
situational awareness. Misconceiving Russian actions, interpreting defensive measures as 
offensive and expansive could consequently lead to unwarranted escalation. Moreover, Russia 
employs a modus operandi that purposely introduces misconceptions, which could 
significantly contribute to erosion of stability. Russian development of weapons could also 
have negative impact. Increased emphasis on allied deterrence must therefore constitute a 
response that Russia perceives as rational and not overly threatening, thus avoiding 
inadvertent erosion of stability. Having a thorough comprehension on Russian capabilities and 
intent is therefore important. Providing for transparency and predictability in the Barents Sea 
is hence key and according to Eikeland one of the main reasons Norway is acquiring the P-8 
  
  
 
57 
 
(Eikeland, 2018). However, stability is still largely dependent on how Russia acts 
(Sommerseth, 2018). 
 Reassurance 
Norway has long traditions in its security policy of balancing deterrence with reassurance in 
its asymmetric power relation with Russia. Some critics argue that the current line chosen by 
the government with increased emphasis on deterrence is displacing Norway’s reassurance 
tradition, thus increasing tensions in its Russia relationship. Ole Marius Tørrisplass concludes 
in his master thesis “Deterrence or reassurance?”, that the two are not a question of either-or, 
and that more deterrence may in fact warrant more reassurance. Norway consequently needs 
to sustain reassurance measures (Tørrisplass, 2017b, p. 80).  
The discussion will address how two merits concerning the Poseidon could have a particular 
influence on Norway’s reassurance towards Russia. First, is the ability to balance threat with 
restraint. Second, and of key importance to Norway security policy, is the significance of the 
P-8 in maintaining Norway’s strategic position in the High North. 
First, I examine the ability to balance threat with restraint. Norway’s security policy has, as a 
response to the current strategic situation, increased the emphasis on deterrence towards 
Russia. Norway’s force structure reflects deterrence through the establishment of offensive 
capabilities with long-range precision guided missiles as well as emphasis on allied 
integration. Although Norway communicates an intention of defence, the emphasis on 
offensive capabilities and deterrence by allied integration, may appear provocative for Russia. 
By offering reassurances through arms control and restraints, a defender could display to the 
adversary that the state will refrain from attack, despite having credible and capable deterrent 
measures (Jervis, 1993, p. 244). 
Russia employs snap-drills and strategic exercises without notice, so Norway’s ability to 
respond with ISR capabilities is critical to distinguish training and exercises from emerging 
aggression (Etterretningstjenesten, 2018, pp. 20-21). In a surge of Russian activity in the 
Barents Sea, the P-8 and F-35 are likely the two Norwegian platforms that provide the 
required responsiveness to establish an immediate presence and situational awareness 
(Øversveen, 2007, p. 41). With the offensive capabilities inherent in the F-35, however, there 
is a risk of unwarranted escalation. There is little to suggest that the small volume of 
Norwegian F-35s and Joint Strike Missiles constitute any strategic threat to Russia. However, 
deploying fighter aircraft with offensive capabilities close to the strategic important areas in 
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the Barents Sea, as a reaction to a Northern Fleet surge of activity, could be misconceived by 
Russia as a signal of a Norwegian escalation (Tørrisplass, 2017a, pp. 55, 58; Øversveen, 
2007, p. 65).  
In contrast, the Norwegian Poseidons could constitute a presence that signals status quo. The 
Norwegian P-8 procurement programme does not currently include an air-to-surface long-
range precision missile capability (Eikeland, 2018). The Poseidon’s armament and roles 
therefore represent a continuation of its predecessor. As the P-3 currently constitutes a 
‘normal’ presence in the Barents Sea, there is good reason to believe that Russia will perceive 
the Norwegian Poseidons as a defensive and benign capability in the future. 
On the other hand, roles and armament for Norwegian P-8s may change in the future. The US 
Navy Poseidons are fitted with various ASMs, like the AGM-84 Harpoon and LRASM anti-
shipping missiles, as well as the AGM-84H/ SLAM-ER land attack missile, which provide 
offensive standoff capabilities (Navy Recognition, 2018; Rogoway, 2014b). As Norwegian 
aircraft are identical, the possibility of obtaining ASMs is present for Norway as well. Rygg 
says that Norway should consider an ASM capability as it provides the joint force commander 
with more warfighting options, and increases the versatility of the platform (Rygg, 2018). The 
Norwegian Department of Defence is according to Eikeland assessing future prospects of air-
to-surface capabilities for the platform (Eikeland, 2018).  
A defensive armament for the P-8 could hence balance Norway’s force structure by providing 
a responsive and flexible reassurance measure as an alternative to the offensive character of 
the F-35. Considerations of other capabilities for Norwegian Poseidons should take into 
account that a more offensive armament could change Russian perception of the aircraft’s 
presence, thus reducing its utility as a reassurance measure further limiting Norway’s 
reassurance options. The balance of having a mix of offensive and defensive capabilities like 
the F-35, the P-8 and the trilateral partnership could provide for escalatory options through 
posturing and geographic location, while retaining reassurance measures (Eikeland, 2018; 
Grandhagen, 2018; Rygg, 2018). 
Second, and of key importance is the significance of the P-8 in maintaining Norway’s 
strategic position in the High North. The aircraft are according to the government key to 
maintaining a leading position with particular knowledge of the strategic environment in the 
High North, and shall through a visible and frequent presence contribute to predictability and 
stability (Regjeringen, 2016a, p. 65). 
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Norway’s MPA operations was according to Klevberg, a central asset in a system of 
intelligence capabilities for balancing integration and screening vis-a-vis key NATO allies 
during the Cold War. He further concludes that tighter integration in the allied partnership 
often unleashed a more vigorous Norwegian effort to underscore screening (Klevberg, 2012, 
p. 411; Tamnes & Eriksen, 1999). Norway’s restrictions on allied flights crossing the 24°E 
into the Barents Sea intended as a reassurance measure towards the Soviet Union, and 
intelligence capabilities, positioned Norway as the key provider of strategic information to its 
allies during the Cold War. 
As Klevberg describes, Norwegian control with information from Norwegian areas of interest 
was regulated through restrictions on allied operations - in other terms screening. The 
Norwegian screening policy provided in turn Norway with surveillance technology. This 
relationship continued after the Cold War, and when allied MPA activity wore off in the 
North Atlantic, Norway enjoyed nearly a monopoly in the Barents Sea in the 2000s 
(Klevberg, 2012, pp. 413-414).  
Norwegian efforts to turn the focus of the Alliance back to collective defence and regional 
challenges, would not have had the momentum and influence it gained unless founded on 
solid information of Russian capabilities and developments. The importance of re-establishing 
the North Atlantic and the High North as a region of military strategic significance to the 
Alliance highlights the importance of MPAs for Norway and NATO. 
As Norway is integrating with the US and UK in a Poseidon partnership, there could however 
be a need for Norway to reemphasize restrictions on allied operations in the Barents Sea. 
Surges of Russian activity or an American or British desire to establish their own presence 
and intelligence collection in an area of particular national strategic valuable may appear 
appropriate, and put Norway’s established strategic position and reassurance policy at risk. 
Grandhagen says, however, that there is no obvious reason for the US or the UK to have a 
visible presence in the Barents Sea, for several reasons:  
The balance of reassurance and deterrence is no less important now than during 
the Cold War, on the contrary. It is considerably easier for a small state to 
operate in this region than a larger military power. If you bring American 
aircraft directly into Russian areas of operation, it automatically increases the 
strategic tension. It is in my opinion not necessary to do so as we operate the 
same systems. By maintaining the Barents Sea as a Norwegian area of 
responsibility, it is possible to yield low-tension benefits. With the amount of 
aircraft we acquire and the capability they bring, our national ability to solve 
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this represents no issue regarding to capacity. So I would expect, even presume, 
that restrictions continue to apply (Grandhagen, 2018). 
The UK and the US are according to Eikeland content with a Norwegian ‘ownership’ of the 
Barents Sea, and they are facilitating for Norway to maintain this position. However, in a 
surge of Russian activity, it will be an ongoing assessment (Eikeland, 2018). Sommerseth also 
says that Norway’s allies are supportive of maintaining a geographic distribution of 
responsibility where Norway provides for the Barents Sea. The only thing that could threaten 
this division of responsibility, is the inability to maintain a Norwegian presence and 
surveillance until the reception of the P-8, due to the low availability of the current MPAs 
(Sommerseth, 2018).  
Eikeland says that Norway now has a particularly interesting strategic position among its 
allies, much in part due to the P-8 and the trilateral cooperation, and a timing that serves 
Norway well. The new Severodvinsk multipurpose submarines together with other Russian 
submarines have become a strategic threat to the transatlantic link and NATO. The P-8 
consequently establishes Norway in a position to offer a solution to significantly improve a 
strategic problem for NATO. Moreover, the close MPA collaboration with the UK and the 
US, the most capable and powerful maritime nations in NATO, implies that Norway is 
entering a higher level in the Alliance. The F-35 and the P-8 are according to Eikeland also 
formative of NATO’s emerging strategy in the North. In its strategic relationship with allies, 
Norway is about to strengthen its position, which could improve its influence on a NATO 
maritime strategy in the High North (Eikeland, 2018). 
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 Summary 
Because of Russian submarines armed with Kalibr missiles in particular, in order to maintain 
a credible deterrence strategy, NATO should change from a defensive strategy of denial, to an 
offensive ‘hold at risk’ ASW strategy. This would enable the Alliance to track Russian 
submarines regardless of location. The P-8 provides an unprecedented surveillance capability 
combined with a complete kill chain capability. However, in order to establish a broad allied 
ASW deterrence, its main contribution would be to cooperate closely and integrate with other 
assets, capable of high-end ASW operations in contested areas. The Poseidon does not have 
that capability due to its vulnerability to air threats. 
The US Navy’s broad range of ASW capabilities is a cornerstone to allied warfare in a 
contested environment. The Poseidon paves the way for Norwegian integration in three major 
ways. First, the P-8 level of interoperability with US Navy warfighting capabilities is 
unprecedented. Second, it is a major contribution to burden-sharing in the sense that it closes 
a major capability gap and addresses a strategic problem for the Alliance. Third, and the most 
significant, is bilateral integration with the US coming from intelligence exchange. Norway 
will probably continue to have privileged access to the Barents Sea, and thus remain a vital 
intelligence and surveillance asset for Norway’s allies. The added capability of the Poseidon 
together with Norwegian access to the Barents Sea, will improve the quality of the 
intelligence exchange, which underscores the importance of P-8 in strengthening deterrence 
by integration. 
The Poseidon and the trilateral partnership influence crisis stability in three major ways: By 
reducing the risk of a Russian pre-emptive strike, the potential for a Russian surprise attack to 
achieve fait accompli, and minimise the danger of unwarranted escalation. First, the 
Poseidon’s wide area surveillance and network capabilities could facilitate for allied joint 
ASW forces to maintain a withdrawn posture in the North Atlantic. A presence of Norwegian 
MPAs in the Barents Sea could hence provide for situational awareness and enable a surge of 
joint ASW forces if required. By geographic restriction in peacetime, the footprint of 
offensive NATO capabilities in the Barents Sea could consequently reduce the perception of a 
prisoner’s dilemma for Russia. Second, the potential for a Russian surprise attack and fait 
accompli could be reduced by signalling allied commitment through the trilateral partnership. 
However, the impermanent character of American MPAs highlights the need for a trilateral 
operations concept that by common training, exercises and operations would focus on 
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extensive activity in the North Atlantic. Third, the potential for unwarranted escalation could 
be reduced by the P-8’s ability to enable a comprehensive situational awareness. By providing 
for transparency and predictability, the aircraft can contribute to counter Russian deception 
that could lead to misconceptions and potentially unwarranted escalation.  
As Norway is increasingly dependent on deterrence, it should also increase its focus on 
reassurance. As a reassurance measure the P-8 is about to become of vital importance. With 
Norway’s increased emphasis on long-range precision guided weapons, the P-8 will in the 
near future become a key crisis management asset of a defensive character. With its 
responsiveness and surveillance capabilities the aircraft can establish an immediate situational 
awareness in the High North. As it does not constitute a long-range precision missile threat to 
Russia, its defensive nature is central in signalling reassurance and balancing other 
Norwegian or allied force elements. 
Of particular significance to reassurance is the contribution of the P-8 to maintain Norway’s 
strategic position in the Barents Sea. Norway’s Poseidons will facilitate for improved 
presence in the Barents Sea and intelligence to NATO and the US. This will sustain and even 
improve Norway’s military strategic position. It could also, in conjunction with the trilateral 
partnership, improve Norway’s standing in the Alliance and consequently increase Norway’s 
saying in an allied maritime strategy for the High North. 
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Part IV – Conclusions 
This study has examined the significance of the P-8 and the trilateral partnership for Norway. 
The thesis has focused on the operational significance as well as the influence of the P-8 and 
the trilateral partnership on Norwegian security policy. Theories of deterrence and crisis 
stability as well as maritime airpower have provided a framework for answering the research 
questions, as well as bridging operational capability to Norway’s security policy, defence 
concept and the strategic background. 
The strategic context is characterized by Russia’s assertive and expansionist conduct and 
strategies aimed at undermining and destabilizing the West. This has established a new 
normal in the relationship between NATO and Russia in which strategic stability has 
weakened compared to the Cold War. At the same time, the High North is still characterised 
by economic and institutionalised cooperation, and is as such not likely a source of neither 
regional nor strategic conflict. A military conflict in the region will most likely be a spillover 
from conflicts in other places. Should an armed conflict occur between Russia and NATO in 
the High North, Russia will give priority to protecting its strategic submarines by establishing 
the Bastion Defence. Attack and multipurpose submarines are central, in conducting sea 
denial operations in the layered defence of the SSBNs, and carrying out interdict operations 
against the transatlantic SLOC.  
The introduction of Kalibr long-range precision guided cruise missiles on Russian submarines 
and other platforms has significantly increased Russia’s capability to defend the Bastion and 
conduct interdict operations towards NATO in the North Atlantic. Of particular significance, 
the offensive capabilities of Kalibr land-attack missiles provide Russia with the ability to hold 
the European and US mainland at risk. There are currently no prospects of any allied denial 
strategies that could prove effective for defence. Pre-emptive measures consequently stand 
out as the only viable deterrent strategy for NATO facing Russian submarines with Kalibr 
missiles. This brings us to the heart of the security dilemma and it may undermine crisis 
stability. 
NATO continues to as the cornerstone of Norwegian security. Russia’s military conduct and 
military capabilities underscore the need for NATO to develop a strategy for seamless 
escalation and transition to collective defence. Hence, are deeper integration and 
interoperability with NATO of fundamental importance to Norway. Of particular significance 
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to integration of its allies, is the ability to sustain surveillance for indications and warnings as 
well as intelligence on Russian capabilities and intent. 
The growing operational significance of the P-8 is the result of enhanced capacity for Norway 
and NATO to sustain MPA presence, and improved agility and responsiveness to develop a 
situational awareness on emerging situations or crises. A high-altitude ASW concept 
provides, along with better sensors, a sustained wide area surveillance capability over, at and 
below the surface, which will be a qualitative leap in capability for Norway. The 
developments in sub-surface sensors significantly widens the search area in ASW. As the 
improved ASW capability enhances the ability to find and track submarines, the prospects of 
gaining intelligence on submarines is consequently improved. 
Because of its network capabilities, the P-8 is able to provide decision-makers at all levels 
with timely and accurate situational awareness. Particularly for indications and warnings, are 
the wide area surveillance and network capabilities significant as it allows a theatre wide 
near-real time situational awareness. Network capabilities also open up for engaging in cross 
cueing of sensors and weapons in networked ASW and ISR. However, the Poseidon’s 
network capabilities rely on Norway’s ability to establish C4ISR infrastructures in the High 
North to exploit the aircraft’s full surveillance and warfare capabilities. 
The operational significance of the trilateral partnership reflects the fact that more 
interoperability and integration will increase NATO’s overall capability to conduct ASW. 
Sharing facilities and basing will significantly improve the ability to sustain a continuous 
surveillance of Russian submarines in the North Atlantic. US P-8 participation in a flexible 
format adds substantial capacity to Norwegian and UK patrols during surges of Russian 
submarine deployments in the North Atlantic. 
The P-8 and the trilateral partnership contributes to strengthening Norwegian security policy 
by improving deterrence and crisis stability and by providing a significant contribution to 
Norway’s reassurance efforts. 
Close cooperation and deeper integration between Norway, the US and NATO is the most 
significant contribution to deterrence. By being extensively interoperable with US Navy 
warfighting capabilities, closing capability gaps and addressing a strategic problem for the 
Alliance, the P-8 and the trilateral partnership strengthen allied deterrence. Norwegian 
Poseidons surveillance and intelligence contribution are crucial in providing NATO, and 
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specifically the US, with indications and warnings as well as intelligence on Russian 
capabilities and intent. 
Crisis stability could be positively influenced by the P-8. However, it depends on the choice 
of NATO maritime strategy for the High North. A strategy in which forward allied ASW 
presence in the Barents Sea is left to Norwegian P-8s, reduces the security dilemma for 
Russia. The risk of a Russian surprise attack to achieve a fait accompli is reduced because of 
the trilateral partnership, as it signals allied commitments to support Norway. However, given 
the impermanency of American Poseidons, it is necessary to establish a concept that merges 
training, exercises and operations in the North Atlantic to reinforce the Russian perception of 
American involvement. Due to Russia’s modes of operation, the need for transparency and 
predictability is one of the primary reasons for acquiring the Poseidon for Norway. Increased 
presence as well as improved ASW and ISR capabilities will have a significant and positive 
influence by reducing the risk of unwarranted escalation. 
For reassurance purposes, the Norwegian P-8 will in the near future become a key defensive 
asset in Norway’s force structure that boasts the required range, responsiveness and 
capabilities to provide for crisis management in the High North. The P-8 is hence vital to 
Norway by signalling restraint. Moreover, Norway’s acquisition of the P-8, the trilateral 
partnership, and the F-35 is improving Norway’s standing in the Alliance. This could increase 
Norway’s influence on formulating the maritime strategy for the High North. 
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Abbreviations 
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial 
AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling 
ACINT Acoustic Intelligence 
ASM Air-to-Surface Missile 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
C4ISR Command & Control, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance 
ESM Electronic Support Measures 
EW Electronic Warfare 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HAASW High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare 
HAAWC High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Weapon Capability 
HEO High Elliptic Orbit 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance 
LACM Land-Attack Cruise Missile 
LRMPA Long-Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
LTP Long Term Plan for the Norwegian Defence Sector 
MAC Multi-static Active Coherent 
MMA Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft 
MMF Multinational Multi-role tanker transport Fleet 
NSNW Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SLBM Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile 
SLOC Sea Lines Of Communication 
SSBN Ship Submersible Ballistic missile Nuclear 
SSGN Ship Submersible Guided missile Nuclear 
SSK Ship Submersible Conventional 
SSN Ship Submersible Nuclear 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UNCLCS United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Seas 
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
WBSC Wide-Band Satellite Communications 
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